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

TORPEDO BOAT.

MANNING

THE

ROYAL NAVY & MERCANTILE MARINE;

ALSO

BELLIGERENT

AND

NEUTRAL RIGHTS

IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

A REVIEW OF THE PAST AND PRESENT METHODS OF MANNING, WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT; AND, THE FORMATION OF MORE RELIABLE AND PERMANENT RESERVES:

ALSO AN INQUIRY INTO THE OPERATION OF THE DECLARATION OF PARIS OF 1856, AND PROPOSALS FOR OBVIATING ITS INJURIOUS EFFECTS ON BRITISH MARITIME COMMERCE.

BY

W. S. LINDSAY.

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PREFACE.

DISABLED by infirmity of body from the active participation in public affairs or private business relating to maritime commerce, in which I was formerly engaged, both as a Member of Parliament and a shipowner, I have occupied myself, in my enforced retirement, with an examination of some important questions affecting the maritime interests of the country.

The opinions I have thus formed have been published in a series of articles in the *Nautical Magazine*, in order that they might receive the consideration of its readers who are professionally qualified to form a sound judgment on the subject, and, finding, from the suggestions with which I have been favoured, that the articles have excited considerable interest amongst a portion of the seafaring community, I am encouraged to re-publish them in a revised, and, I hope, materially improved form, for the consideration of the public in general.

In the brief historical outline of the efforts of statesmen and others during the last two centuries, to establish an efficient system for Manning the Navy in times of peace and war, I have deemed it superfluous to re-open, in any way, the discussions respecting navigation laws or others having for their object protection for shipping, which, during the early part of my political career, engaged so

much public attention. All these were finally relinquished by the complete recognition, a quarter of a century ago, of the principles of free commerce and free navigation, under which the enterprise and industry of the nation, and its consequent increase of wealth and resources, have reached their present greatness; so that no thoughtful persons can desire their restoration.

On the contrary, I have endeavoured to show that, however great may be the changes made in our national laws as affects shipping, they have not kept pace with the progress of events; that they should be better adapted to the present state of our maritime affairs, so as to ensure more complete discipline in our Merchant Service; a more adequate supply of trained and educated seamen, alike for Her Majesty's Navy and for the Mercantile Marine in time of peace; and a sufficient Naval Reserve to meet the exigencies of war.

Former plans proposed by high authorities, as described in my short review of them, were based on the amalgamation of the Naval and Mercantile divisions of the maritime service, but they failed for want of a satisfactory method of providing for a suitable and sufficient source of supply whence the men might be derived. The zeal, however, now manifested for the education and improvement of destitute and abandoned children has gathered into our union-schools, asylums, reformatories, and training-ships many thousand boys who would otherwise become outcasts and pests of society. I have pointed out how, by educating and turning to account a portion of these boys, inclined to follow seafaring pursuits, and who are fit for them, the causes of former failure may be obviated; and that, while an economy

of more than half-a-million sterling may be effected in the administration, increased efficiency of that branch of the Navy may be secured, and the Mercantile Marine, at the same time, supplied with a greater number than it now possesses, of men better qualified for the performance of their duties.

However anxious we may be for the efficiency of the Royal Navy to defend the country in time of war, or to deter other nations from seeking occasion for breaking the peace, it is not the less urgent to examine, whether International Law, as now recognised, accords with the conditions under which our maritime commerce would have to be carried on in time of war.

The Declaration of Paris of 1856, as regards those Powers who have acquiesced in it, and the Convention of 1871 between our own country and the United States of America, have, however wise and necessary, left us in the dilemma of having advanced, though in the right direction, far enough to place our maritime commerce in great jeopardy, but not far enough to reach the haven where that commerce would be safe in the event of war.

In pointing out, as I have attempted to do, how we may extricate ourselves from this difficulty, I am fortunate in being able to quote the opinions of my late friend Mr. Richard Cobden, who, much as he deprecated war, was most anxious to mitigate the sufferings it entails, should it eventually arise. Many extracts from letters, hitherto unpublished, addressed by him to myself on this important subject between the years 1856 and 1860, will be found in the following pages.

But, beyond the advantages I have derived from a careful consideration of the views of Mr. Cobden, fur-

nished at a time when his mind was intent on the subject, and when he had evidently made himself thoroughly master of the effect which the Declaration of Paris would have upon our commerce, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance I have received, in preparing this publication, from men practically conversant with its bearings, and others, eminent as statesmen and lawyers.

So far as regards Manning, I am especially indebted to Mr. Stoneham, the Registrar-General of Seamen, and to Captain J. C. Wilson, of H.M. ship *Thunderer*, for their assistance in calculating the probable result of the scheme I have proposed; as also to the Admiralty and the Board of Trade, for readily furnishing me with all the official papers I desired to elucidate this subject.

I trust the suggestions I have offered, may engage the attention of the authorities, to whose care the Royal Navy and Merchant Service are committed, as well as our ship-owners, and beyond all, receive the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the end that the rights of neutrals and belligerents, in time of war, may be more justly and wisely defined.

W. S. LINDSAY.

Shepperton Manor,

January, 1877.

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OUR MARITIME DEFENCES.

CHAPTER I.

Although Great Britain, from her insular position, is much more secure against foreign aggression than any other European nation, the posibility of invasion has ever been a source of the deepest anxiety to her people, and frequently of needless alarms. Indeed, from the time when Napoleon I. commenced that career of territorial conquest which ended in his exile to St. Helena, we lived in the midst of alarms. Nor did these cease with his overthrow, or when all that was mortal of that restless conqueror lay entombed far away from the strife of nations. I shall not stop to enquire into the cause, but since then we have expended many millions on fortifications and otherwise, for the protection of our shores.

Although events have proved that for more than half-a-century the vast sums of money thus expended, as well as the further expenditure on our Army and Navy, might, in a great measure, have been saved, I am not prepared to coincide with those writers who attempt to show that our preparations for war have on every occasion been a waste of our national resources. Far from it: our warlike attitude, while it no doubt induced other nations to increase their armaments, may, in more than one instance, have prevented war, for nations prone to war are, in the motives which actuate their conduct, frequently not unlike the common burglar who calculates the risks before he pounces upon his prey. Indeed, I go so far as

to admit, though I have considered the rumours of invasion in my own time as something worse than idle, that the Volunteer movement a few years ago, while tending to place at ease the minds of timid people, produced a material effect on these would-be invaders, and banished the thought of invading this country if it were ever seriously entertained by any Government.

I am no alarmist; on the contrary, I entertain the opinion—held by too few men who have taken part in public affairs—that all differences between nations should be settled by arbitration. But while holding that opinion, I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that human nature is as prone to quarrel as ever. In our courts of law litigants frequently expend, in contesting money payments, a very great deal more than the sum at issue, to obtain what they call "their rights." Ludicrous cases occasionally occur, especially amongst my own countrymen (Scotsmen), where a litigant will carry a question respecting the position of a ditch or hedge, of practically no value to either of the contending parties, from the Court of Session to the House of Lords to decide to whom the ditch or hedge may belong, or who should clean the one or trim the other; and hundreds, and even thousands of pounds sterling are sometimes expended in the settlement of a question involving an outlay of a few shillings.

As it is with individuals, so it is with nations, and I suppose it is for these reasons that monarchs and princes, born to rule and accustomed to have their own way at home, as well as oppressed nationalties, still decline to settle their disputes by any means short of war. It, however, says little for the progress of civilisation that they do not attempt, by every means short of national honour, to settle their differences amicably, instead of mustering legions of innocent men, who are frequently altogether ignorant of the cause of dispute, to bring it to an issue by the sacrifice of their lives and the ruin of their homes—in

a word, by the same brute force, which savages still adopt, and only differing from it by more scientific and more wholesale modes of destruction.

Although sharing at the time with many other persons the feeling that £3,000,000 was much too heavy a penalty for us to pay for the loss the mercantile community of the United States sustained by our negligence during the late unfortunate war in that country, I should rather, when it was decided we were wrong, have paid ten times that penalty than have gone to war. So far from being lowered in the estimation of all good and wise men by the course we adopted, it redounded to our honour as a nation. Great Britain certainly stands much higher now than she would have done had she gone to war and won her cause by force of arms—to say nothing about the suffering and loss that war would have entailed on the people of both countries.

Nevertheless, with all my hatred of war and anxiety for peace, I can see few signs of the time when nations are to beat "their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks." On the contrary, the gloomy hosts of war appear to be gathering round us, more darkly and densely than ever. What mean those vast armies which the nations of Europe are now collecting? For what purpose does Germany increase her legions of armed men, and seek for seaports to construct stupendous ironclad ships* of war? Wherein lies the necessity of Russia,

* Germany has thirteen ironclads afloat, three of which are turret-ships—viz., the *Preussen*, *Friedrich der Grosse*, and the *Grosse Kurfürst*. The first of these was built at the private dockyard of the Vulcan Company, at Stettin, and was launched in November, 1873; the second named was built at Ellerbeck, near Kiel, and launched in September, 1874; the third named was built at Wilhelmshafen, and launched in September, 1875. They are full-rigged vessels, and constructed after the model of the British ship *Monarch*. There are also three broadside frigates—viz., the *Konig Wilhelm*, built at the Thames Ironworks, and reckoned to be the most powerful in the fleet; the *Kronprinz*, built by

France, and Italy, with few or no colonies, and only a comparatively small maritime commerce to protect, expending huge sums of money in the construction of vessels of that description?

These are questions not easily answered, unless we find their solution in the deep-rooted animosity which exists between France and Germany, or in what is known as the perplexed and critical "Eastern Question," wherein we may unhappily be involved, against our will, at any moment. In such an unfortunate contingency, this island offers so many temptations that, however improbable, invasion is not an impossible event; and, considering the enormous amount at stake, we must ever be prepared to resist any attempt to land a foreign army on our shores or to blockade our ports.

If our strength be measured by our *wealth*, by the number of ironclads we have now afloat, and by our resources in other respects as compared with other nations, we are, perhaps, more powerful now than we were when "all the world was in arms against us." But the relative positions of nations have, since then, materially changed in various important matters. Nor must we flatter ourselves with the too popular notion that money can do everything, and that we could turn our resources to account between the time when war was declared, and when operations actually commenced. A complete organisation of our forces, active and in reserve,

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Samuda; and the *Friedrich Karl*, built near Toulon. Then there are two casemated frigates, the *Kaiser* and the *Deutschland*, both built by Samuda, and delivered at Wilhelmshafen last year. There are also three ironclad corvettes, the *Leipzig* and *Hansa*, both built by the Vulcan Company, near Stettin, and the *Elisabeth*; the monitor *Arminius*, and the little armoured vessel *Prince Adalbert*, make up the thirteen, the former built in France, and the latter by Samuda, at Poplar. The corvette *Elisabeth* has just undergone a thorough repair at Dantsic, and was commissioned on June 1, instead of October 1, as was at first intended. She is now taking in her provisions and ammunition, and

and a thorough knowledge of how these and our vast indirect resources could be promptly and effectually applied, would be of more importance to us on the outbreak of war than the large capital at our command, however serviceable that might be in the long run. One great cause of our weakness in 1854 was the want of this organisation; yet, so far as regards reserves of trained seamen and the prompt utilisation of merchant ships and private dock-yards, we are really in no better position now than we were then.

Unfortunately, the great Continental Powers are now armed ready for war at a day's notice, and by means of the telegraph and steam, by land and sea, these forces could be concentrated at any given point in Europe, even at the most available parts of our shores within four, or, at most, six days, from the time of the declaration of war. Thus, a combination of Powers arrayed against us would necessitate on the first brush of war the employment of the whole of our immediately available resources to repel invasion, and to protect our great *entrepots* of maritime commerce, on which we depend, not merely for supplies, but for our daily food.

In the meantime, how are our Colonies, our coal depots, and our vast fleets of merchantmen to be protected? Herein rests our weakness, which unfortunately increases with the improved appliances of war, and the extraordinary extension of our Mercantile Marine.

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proceeds shortly to Philadelphia. The turret-ship *Preussen* has just made her trial trip at Swinemunde, and the result is reported to be satisfactory. Besides the above-mentioned vessels actually afloat, there are several on the stocks and in various stages of progress, and these when finished will raise the fleet to a very respectable degree of strength. The fortified places, both on the German seacoast and inland, are now about to be enlarged and strengthened, the places mentioned being Dantsic, Konigsberg, Glogau, Nievre, Memel, Pillau, Kolberg, Swinemunde, Stralsund, Friedrichsort, Sonderburg, Düppel, Wilhelmshafen, the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe, Cologne, Coblentz, Spandau, Cuestern, Posen, and Thorn.—*Army and Navy Gazette*, June, 1876.

By the declaration respecting Maritime Law, adopted by the European Powers assembled in Congress at Paris, on the 16th April, 1856, protection is now afforded to enemies' goods under a neutral flag, and to neutral goods. To that declaration I shall hereafter very fully refer. In the meantime, I may frankly admit, and I do so with satisfaction, that the progress of nations and other events had rendered it imperatively necessary; but unless we can induce all nations to take one step further in advance and adopt the proposal more than once officially offered by the United States, that private property, wherever found, should be free from capture, our maritime commerce would, in the event of war with that country, be swept from the seas.*

As the future action of the United States is, however, a matter of conjecture, it behoves us to consider how we should stand, under existing circumstances, in the event of a great European war. So far as regards ships, our means of defence have materially changed. Within the last few years we have expended very large sums of money in the creation of huge ironclads, or floating citadels, each of which, when fully equipped, costs somewhere about half-a-million sterling. But have we ever asked ourselves the question, how these huge flotillas are to be employed in the event of war. If for the protection of the Thames, Mersey, Solent, and Medway, or the blockade of the principal forts of the enemy, we should do well to enquire what their value would be to us in even these important services, considering their cost? Some of them are to mount guns of 81 tons weight—unquestionably huge instruments of destruction

* I brought this grave matter under the notice of the House of Commons in 1857, and again March 14, 1860, and a letter I addressed to Lord John Russell, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on this subject, was ordered to be published. (See Parliamentary Paper. Belligerent Rights—No. 151. Session 1860.)

—but will they be as efficient for the purposes I have named, as vessels of greater speed, and of only one-quarter their cost? *I doubt it.* Nor do I exclude from my doubts such vessels as the *Inflexible* and *Dreadnought*, which are each, I understand, to mount four of these guns on turrets, and to cost, ready for sea, £750,000!! In the destruction of fortifications, as at present constructed, an 81-ton gun would unquestionably make fearful havoc, but against earth mounds of ample depth, or batteries on the Moncrieff system, it would be very little more effective than the old 64-pound gun; while its efficiency—considering its cost—for the purpose of protection, would be far from complete. A swift ship could run the gauntlet past one of these floating citadels without much chance of being hit by its ponderous shot. I question, if in action, each of these guns could be fired every ten or fifteen minutes, and that space of time represents, in a swift steamer, three or four miles, when an enemy's cruiser, if not hit (and the chances are five—if not ten—to one in her favour), would be out of range before a second round could be fired.

Although an ordinary vessel could not attack them with much prospect of success, it could evade them, and play terrible havoc with the property they were meant to protect. For these reasons I am disposed to think that we have recently been expending much more money on these ponderous floating batteries than their value to us in the hour of need would justify; and it is a matter hardly to be questioned that we have, in a great measure, adopted this policy because other nations are building ships of like huge dimensions.

Instead of troubling ourselves about what other nations do, I think we should consider what is requisite for our own wants. Such has been our wisest policy in all commercial matters, and we shall do well to adhere to it in our preparations to meet the eventualities of war.

Tactics and science will now have more to do with the settlement of disputes between nations than actions fought at close quarters "in line of battle." Indeed, the French are said to have quite given up the idea of fighting in line or formation. The indomitable bull-dog courage of our seamen will now be of much less avail than it was at Copenhagen or Trafalgar; and the swift ship, long-range, and scientific gunner, will carry the day in naval engagements. Let us face these facts. It is necessary we should do so, more especially as another instrument of destruction, much more terrible than the largest iron-clad has now been discovered. The power of torpedoes, and their value for the protection of harbours, have been known for some years.* They are, however, now to be employed in another and apparently very effective and destructive form.

Messrs. John J. Thornycroft and Co., of Chiswick, have already constructed torpedo boats for the French, Austrian, Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Governments. In the Frontispiece will be found an illustration of one of these ready for action. She is 67 feet in length, by 8½ feet in width; she is built of steel, and is rifle-proof in the parts containing the machinery and the crew engaged in working the torpedoes. On her trial trips she steamed in smooth water 18 knots an hour, and maintained that rate of speed for two consecutive hours. The cost of each of these vessels, fully equipped and ready for sea, is about £4,000. There are two poles, about 40 feet in length, ready to be projected from the bows, and to the end of each

* Besides the Star torpedo, worked from a boat, we have Harvey's towing torpedo, easily managed in a swift steam vessel of small size; and the Whitehead fish torpedo, the most formidable engine of destruction yet invented. These are now made 19 feet long, with a speed of from 20 to 22 knots per hour, which they maintain for 800 or 1,000 yards. They can also be discharged from the broadside of a ship, going full speed, from a carriage placed in the upper or gun deck of the ship.

of these is attached a torpedo,* or copper cone, resembling in form a pine-apple, which is charged with either 33 lbs. of gun-cotton or 25 lbs. of dynamite. This cone explodes the instant it strikes a solid body, or it can be exploded by anyone on board the boat by means of a firing key on the wire connecting the cone to the battery. By a very simple process these torpedo poles can be run out beyond the boat's bow, and instantly lowered to an angle at which the end of the torpedo cone would strike a ship's bottom, or they may be projected from the boat's side so as to strike a ship at from 6 to 9 feet below the water-line when the torpedo boat is running alongside, and should the officer in charge think the cone will not strike the ship, he can fire the charge by means of the firing key on board. In either case the force of the explosion, even when fired within 3 feet of the ship, would be so great as to sink almost instantaneously the largest armour-clad. By experiments which have been recently made, a torpedo charged to the limited extent named, made a hole through a ship's bottom 7 feet in width, and 18 feet in length! In a word, tore up, in the most frightful manner, the plating and planking of the vessel against which it was exploded.

A ship costing half-a-million sterling, and with, what is far more precious, 600 to 700 men on board, might thus be instantaneously destroyed by a torpedo boat costing only £4,000, and with less risk to herself than might be supposed; for experiments have shown that the explosion of the torpedo cannot in any way injure the vessel which carries it, unless she gets entangled with the wreck of the ship she has destroyed.†

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* The torpedo gear is so arranged that an attack may be made directly a-head of the boat, in which case the boat must be stopped and backed off her enemy immediately after the explosion, or on the broad-side, when the boat may be kept going a-head all the time, and so saving the time which would be otherwise lost in stopping and backing.

† The importance of speed in such an operation as sinking an iron-

These are facts of momentous importance to us as a nation, and worthy of the greatest consideration before we construct any ships to carry 81-ton guns. The more so when we know that the larger the vessel the more she is likely to fall a prey to torpedes or swift torpedo boat. Indeed, her size would cause her to be more susceptible to attack, and her slower speed would render it more difficult for her to get out of the way of an active enemy.

However secondary the expense when compared with safety, it should receive immediate consideration by our statesmen, as we are already heavily taxed for the cost of naval armaments, to, I fear, comparatively little purpose. One hundred of these craft, or one thousand Whitehead torpedoes, could be constructed at less cost than we have expended on our last floating citadel.

But let us consider the question in the aspect of humanity. It is true that the professed object of war is to "burn, sink, and destroy." In itself it was horrible enough in the days of our forefathers, but it has become much more horrible since science, which was meant to improve and elevate the human race, has been turned so largely to account for its destruction.

Civilised nations have, however, limited the use of wholesale means for destroying human life. To poison the wells of an enemy's country, or to throw red hot shot into their towns, have hitherto been denounced as the

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clad can scarcely be overrated. The difficulty of hitting a moving target is well known to those who have tried to hit the running deer at Wimbledon; and the velocity of a torpedo boat running at 18 knots is over 30 feet per second. High speed also gives men confidence, by affording them a chance of returning safely from a necessarily dangerous expedition, and thus lessens the difficulty of finding men for such work.

Another important matter in such operations is silence, and this is secured in Messrs. Thornycroft and Co.'s boat by making the engines condensing, so that the puffing noise in the chimney, which is almost a distinguishing feature in the ordinary steam launch, is entirely done away with.

extremes of barbarity; and the application of other terrible instruments for destroying lives in mass, invented in our time (known as "infernal machines"), has been repudiated by all nations with indignation and scorn.

But wherein is the difference between such instruments and torpedoes? If the principle as applicable to the laws of humanity is sound in the one case, it is equally so in the other. Statesmen have always held that combatants should have a fair chance of displaying their bravery, or, at least, of defending their lives. Indeed, the open, stand-up fight has ever been considered one of the "glories of war." But while the use of torpedoes must put an end to the former mode of conducting maritime warfare, it may, happily, have the effect of repressing war which would then become so terrible that princes and statesmen, as well as nationalities, would hesitate long before they embarked in it.

How, indeed, could we order 600 men, for instance, to coop themselves up in a large armour-clad ship to be drowned like rats, without any chance or hope of defending themselves against the horrible ravages of such an infernal instrument as a torpedo? To attempt to enforce our orders might produce the most disastrous results. Our seamen are reluctant even now to enter for these ships, and the fate of the *Captain* and *Vanguard* has materially increased their reluctance; they much prefer a smart frigate, where their individual skill and bravery can be displayed to advantage; and were it not for the continuous service, I doubt if our armour-clads could be manned in peace: how then would it be in war? But there are still other matters requiring consideration.

While we have been concentrating our forces in a necessarily limited number of huge floating batteries, we seem to have overlooked the fact that we had colonies and

largely increasing fleets of merchantmen to protect in the event of war.*

Such are a few of the reasons which led me to feel that though our naval expenditure of late years has been enormous, we are at present, *all things considered*, less prepared to meet the various contingencies of war which would arise than we ever were at any other period of our history.

Now that our merchant vessels traverse every sea, and that the most valuable portion of our mercantile commerce is conducted in steamers, we could no longer protect that commerce by means of convoys. We might, however, make arrangements in peace whereby a considerable portion of our merchantmen might protect themselves, and likewise render no mean assistance to the nation in the event of war. To that question I shall hereafter refer. But as our weakest point is a scarcity of seamen, I am anxious to consider that subject in all its bearings in preference to any other, especially as I am more familiar with it than with matters relating to the equipment of the Royal Navy.

At present we have, I understand, a sufficient number of men for the ordinary peace establishment, and by means of the six training-ships under the control of the Admiralty, and the continuous service system, that number, I am informed, can be maintained although with some difficulty, but at a much greater cost than appears to be necessary. Our reserves of seamen, however, fall far

* I dare say all merchant steamers of over twelve knots speed would trust to their *heels* and a couple of good chase guns in the case of war, but our eight knot merchant steamers and our sailing vessels would have to sail under a convoy of ships of war with a strong force of armed merchantmen as auxiliaries. We should also require squadrons to protect all narrows and great centres of trade, such as the Gut of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, St. Vincent, Hong Kong, English and Irish Channels, and have cruisers stationed at intervals along the usual great routes of commerce.

short of what would be required in the event of war, and would barely suffice to man sufficient vessels for our first line of defence. Hitherto we have looked to the merchant service for our supplies, but that service could no longer render us the requisite aid. British seamen have become exceedingly scarce, so much so that large numbers of our merchantmen are now manned by foreigners, and even if the supply were ample, their ignorance of the routine duties of a man-of-war, and especially of gunnery, in these days when so much science and training have become necessary, would render them of little more value than landsmen during the first three or four months after they were embarked—a matter of no mean consideration, as any disaster to our ships on the first brush of war might prove irretrievable.

To obtain the requisite supplies of able seamen for our Merchant Service, so as to have at all times in that service, at a moderate cost, an ample supply of trained men for our defence, although it has been dealt with by numerous writers and speakers, and been considered by various Committees and a Royal Commission, is a problem which has not yet been solved. It seems easy of solution, but it is surrounded with difficulties, and the more I study the subject the more I feel my incompetence to overcome them.

Merchant seamen are not accustomed to men-of-war; they do not like to be subjected to the discipline necessary on board of such vessels, and they can generally find, apart from the remuneration, other occupations, on shore or afloat, more congenial to their tastes and habits. To render that service acceptable to them, and, at the same time, to qualify them for the duties they have to perform, a certain amount of preliminary training is absolutely essential, and herein arise various other difficulties. The nucleus is easy to be found in boys below the age of thirteen or fourteen, from parishes and industrial schools.

But our shipowners say that boys of that age are no good to them, and they ask, with much reason, "why should we be saddled with the expense of training such boys; for when they are good for anything, they leave to find other employment, either on shore, in the service of the State, or in vessels of other countries?" On the other hand, the Government asks, "Why should the public be taxed to train boys for the Merchant Service any more than for any other branch of trade, more especially as the Admiralty train all the boys that are required for the peace establishment of the Royal Navy?"

Such are a few of the difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to solve this important question. But as they are not insurmountable, I purpose examining the leading arguments which have been offered in Blue Books and in numerous speeches and pamphlets. Before doing so, it may, however, be desirable to briefly trace the history of manning ships during the last two centuries, both as regards the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service.

HISTORY OF MANNING.

CHAPTER II.

When discussing the question of our Naval Reserves, we are invariably reminded of the great resources possessed by continental nations in their trained seamen, as if those men could be marched on board their ships of war like so many machines whenever their services should be required; but James, in his Naval History (vol. 1, p. 53), states that though France, like ourselves, exercised the most rigorous powers of impressment, and had very large reserves of seamen "*bound to serve the State*," she was obliged, in 1792, when war was declared with England, to resort to various measures calculated to rouse the patriotism of her seafaring population, "and invigorate their efforts." With that object in view, we are told that violent invectives were cast upon the King and Government of this country, while enticing allurements were held out to the sailors in the shape of "prize money," augmentation of their pay, and bounties to their wives and children.

Although we have the advantage of our youths taking to seafaring pursuits with greater alacrity than those of any other nation, we must not forget that as they advance in years they require almost as many inducements as Frenchmen to serve on board ships of war, and that they resist with even more determination attempts at impressment. Indeed, compulsory service is more difficult to enforce with British seamen than with those of any other country. Our institutions are opposed to it; and the

spirit and dogged determination of our people, combined with the love of freedom, which has become part of their nature, would now render anything like the application of bodily force not merely futile, but dangerous.

More than a century ago this spirit asserted itself against the press-gang; and we should now have large masses of intelligent, and I might say, educated men, whose "trade unions" would amalgamate, and effectually resist, *compulsory* servitude.

We might appeal, and not in vain, to their patriotism, and with still more effect to their honour, where they had previously engaged for service when required: or we might more effectually do so when the war was popular, and especially if defensive; but though the law still upholds impressment, it would now be impossible to put it in force except in cases of extraordinary emergency; nor would it be desirable to do so.

Even when press-gangs existed as organised bodies, paid and upheld by the State, they produced the most mischievous results. While destroying almost every patriotic feeling in the seafaring population, they involved a stoppage of trade by placing an embargo on all outward-bound ships frequently to the ruin of our merchants. They were likewise very costly, and were the cause of so much bad feeling, misery, and distress, that at an early period of our history numerous schemes were propounded to obviate their necessity.

So far back as 1691, when our fleets, during peace, were manned, as at present, by volunteers, a plan was proposed* to meet an emergency, not unlike some of the schemes of our own time, whereby every boy, whose parents received alms, was to be indentured and bound, at the age of fourteen, to the King, and sent to Greenwich to be educated for the sea. All merchant vessels were to be obliged to

* "Naval Speculations and Maritime Politics," by Henry Maydman.

take one apprentice to every six or ten men, according to the trades in which they were engaged; and a proportion of these boys was to be sent on board the ships of war, while others were to be distributed to learn trades connected with the sea, such as carpenters, caulkers, and sailmakers, the masters being bound to employ a certain number of them.

About the same period another scheme,* which was received with considerable favour, had for its object the raising of "20,000 men, which, with the officers, would be sufficient for the fleet," by means of requiring all owners of vessels, lighters, and boats, and all master shipwrights and other tradesmen, engaged in the construction and equipment of ships, to provide annually, under penalty, a certain number of men for the Navy, according to a graduated scale.

But it was not until 1696 that any Act of Parliament came into force having specially for its object† "the furnishing and supplying of His Majesty's Royal Navy with a competent number of able mariners and seamen which may be in readiness at all times for that service."

With the view of obviating the necessity of impressment, this Act contained provisions for the voluntary registration of seamen between the age of eighteen and fifty, to the number of 30,000, who were to be paid a retaining fee of £2 per annum to serve when required, and who, during their term of service, were to receive enhanced pay, a double share of prize money, and a home in Greenwich Hospital when disabled, or too old for active service.

These inducements, however, do not appear to have had the effect of raising the stipulated number of men.

The Navy then, as has too frequently been the case

* "England's Glory; a Bridle on the French King," by Captain George St. Lo, R.N.

† William III., chap. 788.

since, was not the favoured arm of the national service, and the ruling powers, including royalty itself, showed a marked preference for the Army.

Consequently, the number of men who entered for the Naval Reserve never exceeded 17,000, nor could much dependence be placed on even half that number mustering voluntarily on an emergency. Indeed, it is a matter of wonder that the Government was enabled to induce men to remain in the service, as it appears that Parliament had neglected to vote the funds necessary for their annual retainers, and had fallen far behind in the payment of the wages they had earned. By a return laid before the House of Commons, a sum amounting to no less than £1,036,415 was at one time due to the seamen of the Navy, the whole or greater portion of which was never paid to them. Such conduct on the part of the Crown and Parliament, combined with the bad usage they had to endure, and the wretched provisions and accommodation with which they were supplied, created an immense amount of discontent amongst the seamen of that period, and the severest discipline could not suppress the mutinies which too frequently arose. Numerous instances are recorded where men were hanged for desertion, and even for demanding their pay.* Open defiance of the law and its public rididule were consequently matters of almost daily occurrence.†

Although the country was exasperated by the oppression to which the seamen were subjected, and the disorder which prevailed on board the vessels of the Royal Navy,

* See Ralph's "History of England" during the reigns of William and Mary, Queen Anne, and George I.

† One of the handbills published by the seamen, and extensively circulated, called upon "all seamen that are weary of their lives and desire to serve R. W. (Royal William) on board the Navy Royal shall have for encouragement fair promises and no performance, as follows:—For each able seaman, 24s. per month, to be paid when he can get it, and to be hanged if he demands it."

no effective steps were taken by Parliament to remedy the existing state of things. Governments and statesmen acted very much as they pleased in those days; and the voice of the people was seldom heard except in the anguish of despair or in the tumult of revolt. The latter had, however, become so alarming that, in 1706, the House of Lords voted an address to the Queen, recommending an inquiry into the following points:—(1.) The effectual manning of the fleet; (2.) the encouragement and increase of the number of seamen; and (3.) the restoring and preserving the discipline of the Navy. But in defiance of these recommendations, and although the Act of 1696 had in many respects proved worse than worthless, from thousands of seamen being in hiding, Queen Anne continued to hang seamen for demanding what had been promised by Parliament, under pledge of her own royal word, and ignored the recommendations of the Lords. This law was repealed in 1710.

In 1719, Mr. John Burchett—who was for half a century Secretary to the Admiralty, a man of humane feelings, combined with considerable shrewdness and a thorough knowledge of the wants of the service—recommended the establishment of registry offices, wherein seamen were to enter their names, age, address, and where serving. By such means, he said, "the Admiralty would be at all times aware where and how the men were employed." But the more important object of his scheme seems to have been "that when a certain number of men have been employed a certain time in the service of the Crown they shall have license to enter themselves on board of merchant ships, and, when they have so served a limited time, be obliged to go on board the ships of the Royal Navy when there shall be occasion for them."

Nothing, however, came of these sensible suggestions, and impressment, with all its evils, continued in full force at a cost to the country of £300,000 per annum. Sir

Robert Walpole, in 1740, brought in a Bill for the "General Registry of the Mariners of the Kingdom." When insisting upon the necessity of this measure, he remarked, "After every means of impress had been used until not another man could be got, all the haunts of seamen having been searched, the impress was suspended and protection granted in order that the trading ships might go to sea. This soon made it apparent that there was no want of sailors in the nation; they turned out by thousands—16,000 demanded protection for the colonies and coasters alone."

But his proposal for general registration, resembling in some respects the system then and now in vogue with the French, was not favourably received by Parliament, while the popular cry against it became so strong that he was obliged to withdraw the Bill.

In 1749, however, Lord Barrington, a member of the Board of Admiralty, under Mr. Pelham's administration, re-introduced this measure with certain modifications, wherein he proposed to raise a reserve of 10,000 men by a retaining fee of £10 per annum to each able seaman who held himself ready to serve in the Royal Navy when required.

But though a resolution to that effect passed the House of Commons after a long debate, it was never embodied in any Act of Parliament, no doubt from the fact of its too expensive character. In the meantime, one of the recommendations of George II. on his accession to the throne in 1726, which, however, did not become law until 1747 (20 Geo. II., chap. 38), had a material effect in encouraging seamen, if not to enter the Navy, to remain in the country. By this Act merchant seamen were, for the first time, required to subscribe 6d. per month out of their wages to what was long known as the "Greenwich Fund," towards the support of their aged and infirm. With all its failings, the Greenwich Fund, so long as it

was honestly conducted, gave them what they never had before, and what now the merchant seamen in the Reserve alone have—"a stake in the hedge," a pension in old age, which induced them to stay at home.*

Nine years afterwards the training-ship of the Marine Society was established through the influence and patriotism of Mr. Jonas Hanway, a merchant of the City of London, and an ornament to the age in which he lived. It was the first of its kind, and the institution has been maintained ever since, proving of great value to the Merchant Service and Royal Navy.

Various fresh proposals were made about this period to render impressment unnecessary, as the press-gang had now become, not merely an ineffective and expensive means of obtaining seamen, but an intolerable nuisance to almost every class of the community, an evil, increasing and interfering as the people became more and more intelligent, and in itself practically worse than worthless, for I believe that at no period of our history were the men annually impressed, greater than the whole number of men, engaged in the various press-gangs.

In 1770, the Lord Mayor of London formally represented to the Admiralty that the tradesmen of the City could not go about their lawful callings without being interrupted and insulted by press-gangs; and in the same year the seamen themselves presented a most urgent petition to the King† in which they supplicate his "Majesty's interposition to prevent the unpolitic and abominable practice."‡

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* The Thames Watermen were under a statutory obligation to provide a certain number of seamen for the Navy as long as their special privileges existed, or rather until these were materially modified.

† *Gentleman's Magazine*, September, 1770.

‡ The celebrated novelist, Captain Marryat, wrote an energetic and exhaustive pamphlet condemning the system of impressment, of which he had seen the evils in the early part of his naval career. It received

In 1774, Lieutenant Tomlinson proposed a scheme for rendering impressment unnecessary, which attracted considerable attention. He suggested that every seaman entering the Navy voluntarily, should be allowed leave of absence, while on pay, for ten days to visit his friends before joining his ship, with the expenses of his journey, but making it felony for him to desert after receiving this bounty. Able seamen, by his plan, would not be bound to serve more than three years, and ordinary seamen not more than four years, the former receiving 30s. and the latter 24s. per month while in the service of the State. Landsmen were to be paid 22s. per month, their term of service being for five years. Having completed their servitude, they were to be supplied with certificates protecting them from impressment. He proposed, however, that the whole seafaring population should be obliged to serve, if required, in the Royal Navy, receiving a pension, when fifty years of age, from Greenwich Hospital if they had fulfilled their engagements.

This scheme was brought under notice of the House of Commons on the 11th March, 1777, but, after full debate, the resolution in its favour was rejected. In that year another scheme was suggested, not unlike the existing measure for our Naval Reserve, whereby seamen were to be voluntarily enrolled in time of peace for service during war, and when "not in actual service in King's ships might be permitted to serve on board merchantmen" in cases where the length of service did not exceed six months. Twenty thousand men were to be thus enrolled, each of whom was to receive an annual retaining fee of £5, with £1 on enrolment. But this scheme, also, failed to meet the approval of the then Government.

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considerable attention at the time, but it drew on him the displeasure of our Sailor King, William IV., who, in consequence, refused to bestow on Captain Marryat the order of C.B., to which he was entitled by war service.

In 1793, Pitt, still finding that every scheme, and especially impressment, had signally failed to obtain the number of seamen necessary for the emergency of war, introduced his famous "*Quota Bill*," whereby all seaports and parishes were required "to furnish seamen and landsmen in proportion to their extent for His Majesty's service." The Bill was passed, but so many vagabonds*—frequently the sweepings of our gaols—were thus introduced into our Navy, that various writers of the period were of opinion that the scheme was in a great measure the cause of the mutiny at the Nore, which subsequently brought so much disgrace upon the British fleet.

But impressment contined ;† and although it has not

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* Amongst the numerous instances recorded in the public journals of the period, mention is made of one James Thompson, who, having been *capitally* convicted at the Old Bailey for felony and piracy, was respited on condition that he served in the Navy so long as his services were there required! And Captain E. P. Brenton, in his "Naval History," remarks :—"The seamen who voluntarily entered in 1793, and had fought some of the most glorious of our battles, received but *five pounds* bounty, and these brave fellows saw men, the very refuse and outcasts of society, flying from justice and the vengeance of the laws, come on board with a bounty of *seventy pounds*, for such enormous sums were the merchants obliged to pay for their quota men before the ships were allowed to sail."

† Forty-five press-gang stations were in full operation at the commencement of the great naval war, having an average of 20 men engaged at each station, to which must be added the guardships and tenders. In confirmation of the depraved class of men thus obtained, Admiral Eiken, in his "Naval Battles," states :—"The ships, on the breaking out of the war in 1803, were worse manned than ever. The *Donegal* and *Belleisle* went out to the Mediterranean with not more than 20 men each that could take the wheel, and from that time to the conclusion of the war in 1815 there were few exceptions to the inefficient and miserable state of the ships' crews.

"The *Princess Royal*, in the Channel Fleet, was obliged to *take* 60 *convicts*, and still remained 70 short of her complement, yet in three months time the captain *considered his crew very fair, compared with the general state of the fleet at that time.*

"In 1804, 50 convicts were sent in one draft to the *Bellona*. The *Canada* received 60 Spaniards from the prison ships in one day, and a

been put in force since the close of the last French war, the law has never been repealed.*

In a paper, "Remarks on Manning the Navy," presented by Lord Nelson to Earl St. Vincent on the 13th February, 1803, he estimated the expense of raising seamen at that time to be £20 per head, remarking that no fewer than 42,000 men had deserted during the late

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74 left Plymouth 80 short of complement, the port admiral declaring he had not a single man to give her."

* An old friend of mine—a very distinguished Statesman, who has kindly glanced over the proof-sheets of this article, remarks: "There is no *law enacting* impressment; this is stated in the Encyclopædia Brittanica article 'Impressment,' and I well remember reading a case of resisting and killing one of the ruffians of a press-gang where the Court decided that such killing was not murder, as the acts of the press-gang had no sanction of law."

Anxious to be strictly accurate in all my statements, I addressed the Secretary to the Marine Department of the Board of Trade on this point, and with his usual courtesy and promptitude, he replies: "The operation of the press-gang is this: in the time of danger, Her Majesty, by proclamation, has power to command the services of all her people, or any particular class, or any section of any particular class, and when the class or section whose services are commanded do not come forward, they are *seized and sent* on board. This is called the press-gang system. If you look at the Report of the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy, 1859 (of which, by the way, you were a member), pages 20 and 21, you will there see the law distinctly stated. *I* also enclose copies of the sections of the Acts 5 & 6 William IV.. chap. 24, and 16 & 17 Victoria, chap. 69, which will show you that the compulsory service of men taken against their will may be for five years or longer in emergency. I may, however, add that when required to serve for more than five years, the latter Act provides that they "shall for such extension of service be entitled to such bounty as may be given by such proclamation."

To make quite certain, the above statement was submitted to the Registrar of the Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, who remarks: "You have correctly stated the Law on the subject of impressment. Its legality is undoubted. It is part of the common law of the land."

Further, referring to the "Law relating to the Officers of the Navy," by Harris Prendergast, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, part i., p. 88, I find, "The power of impressment for manning the Navy by the King's Com-

war.* Convinced that "the high wages of the merchant service and seduction of the crimps" were then the chief causes of desertion from the Navy (just as crimps and high wages ashore are now great causes of desertion from merchant ships), his Lordship recommended "that every seaman who had served five years in war, and could produce a certificate of good conduct, should receive two guineas annually; and after eight years, four guineas, exclusive of pension for wounds, &c.". But the expense then, as now, had no doubt material weight with the

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missioners has been a matter of much dispute; but it has been uniformly supported by a series of precedents from so early a date that the learned Mr. Justice Foster has thence concluded it to be a part of the common law of the realm. It is clear that this statute expressly confers this power on the Crown, though many statutes recognise or imply its existence. Thus the Statute 2 Richard II., chap. 4, speaks of mariners being arrested and retained for the King's services as of a thing well known and practised without dispute, and provides a remedy against their running away. The numerous statutes also which have been passed for exempting particular classes of mariners from impressment most evidently imply the legal existence of such a right in the Crown; 'for it is hard' (says Mr. Justice Foster) 'to conceive that the Legislature should frequently mention a practice utterly illegal, and repugnant to the principles of the Constitution, as subsisting without some mark of disapprobation.'"

"Magna Charta" (says the same learned Judge) "hath been expressly and by name confirmed by many Acts of Parliament; my Lord Coke saith, 32, 'And yet the practice of pressing mariners still continued through all ages, and was never, that I know of, once mentioned in any of those Acts as illegal or a violation of the great charter.'"

"The legality of pressing," continues Mr. Prendergast, "in time of war, is now (1852), however so thoroughly established, that Courts of Justice do not ever permit it to be doubted."

* From the beginning of May, 1803 (when hostilities broke out), to the end of June, 1805, the losses by desertion amounted to 9,565 able and ordinary seamen, and 2,785 landsmen. In addition to which 3,017 were invalided, thus occasioning a loss by these means alone of 15,317 men, although all our great seaports and their environs were guarded by detachments of marines and soldiers, who rigidly searched every vehicle that passed in order to prevent the seamen from deserting.

Government, for I do not find that his recommendations were carried into effect.

In the course of the debate in May, 1805, on the Earl of Darnley's motion on the state of the Navy, a suggestion was made by Lord Melville whereby men might be procured for the Royal Navy without resorting to impressment "*in a manner equally beneficial to the interests of the Mercantile and Military services, and whereby the* TWO SERVICES WOULD BECOME MORE UNITED." But his most valuable suggestion was not acted upon. Nor was the proposal of Lord Collingwood to materially increase the number of boys in the Navy, "in order that they might be trained up for our future seamen." Further proposals subsequently made for the general registration of seamen and obtaining them by ballot, and for first educating in the Merchant Service seamen for the Navy, so as in a measure to assimilate the two services, met a similar fate. Consequently, we have ever since found considerable difficulty in manning our fleet when any emergency arose.

In 1816 the guard and harbour ships on our coasts had to be stripped of their crews to provide seamen for the small fleet destined for Algiers. In 1826, Mr. Canning found so much difficulty in manning a somewhat similar expedition to Tagus, that he considered it necessary to threaten to put into force the law of impressment; and in 1832, when we blockaded the Texel, we had almost as much trouble to raise even 1,000 seamen for the few extra ships we then required to commission.

Although in 1834 the first step was taken by *Government* to obtain a *personal* registration of all British seamen, it was not until 1844 that an Act* passed, requiring every seaman to be thus registered, and to have a distinguishing number attached to his name. But the system, and more especially the registration "tickets" required by this Act,

* 7 & 8 Vict., chap. 112, introduced by the late Lord Herbert of Lea, then Mr. Sidney Herbert, in his capacity as Secretary of the Admiralty.

became so obnoxious, and led to so much deception and fraud, that their issue had to be abolished.

In 1852-3, renewed efforts were made by legislation to establish, in peace, a practicable scheme of Reserves on which we could depend in the event of war; but these, as I shall hereafter endeavour to show, have fallen far short of our expectations. In 1853 the continuous service system* was introduced into the Navy, and training-ships were then established, solely at the expense of Government, to keep up the supply, and thus maintain what was first known as a "Standing Navy." In the following year the Act† came into operation for forming the Royal Navy Coast Volunteer Force, under which 8,000 men were enlisted, consisting chiefly of questionable seamen, fishermen, and "long-shore men," including bargemen, wherrymen, and such like.‡

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* Prior to the year 1853 the practice during peace was to enter volunteers for particular ships, nominally for five years, but practically for the period during which the ship remained in commission, averaging from three to four years. This system was attended with great inconvenience to the public service, and even to the men themselves. Having trained these men, at great trouble and expense, to a high state of efficiency, they were suddenly dismissed; and unless they were enabled to obtain re-admission to the service, they too frequently sought, and readily found, employment under a foreign flag. A continuous service system, established in 1853, gave to all men who entered, from the age of eighteen, for service in any of Her Majesty's ships, for a term of ten years, increased pay of from 1d. to 3d. per day, according to their rating; and men re-entering for five years' further continuous and general service, were to have a further increase of from 2d. to 3d. per day; and, on completing the fifteen years' term of service, were to receive a pension of from 7d. to 9d. a-day, provided they had not been out of the service for more than twelve months. After twenty years' continuous and general service, they were to be granted pensions of from 10d. to 1s. 2d. a-day, provided they had not been out of the service more than a total period of five years.

† 16 & 17 Vict., chap. 73.

‡ The number in the force has now (1876) dwindled down to 600 or 800 half-trained seamen, fishermen, &c., &c.

These are the only preliminary steps we had taken, although then actually menaced with the Russian war, so soon afterwards declared, and for which, so far as regards men, we were altogether unprepared.

I now enter upon a period when, as a member of the House of Commons taking a part, however feeble, in all maritime questions, these matters came within my own experience.

I had then made the acquaintance of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, which subsequently ripened into friendship. With all his peculiarities, I could not fail to appreciate his high sense of patriotism, his thorough knowledge of his duties, and his indomitable courage; and when, as I conceived, unjustifiable attacks were made upon him in Parliament, by men high in office, after he had been recalled from the command of the Baltic Fleet, I readily rendered him such assistance as lay in my power. Although I had previously declined to attend the foolish dinner which was given to him at the Reform Club, feeling that such displays were unbecoming on the eve of a great war, I gladly accepted his invitation to visit, at Portsmouth, the fleet he was to command; and I must say that I never saw such a lamentable and disheartened muster under the name of British "seamen." I could not believe it possible that this great maritime country could have produced such a squalid lot of "aquatics." Of the fishermen and "long-shore men" something might be made; but how Sir Charles was to convert the class of landsmen then collected on board nearly all the ships of his fleet into sailors, and train them to action, struck me so much, that I remember remarking to myself, "the Lord have mercy on the British fleet should we again have the world in arms against us."*

* The *Algiers*, a 91-gun ship, had 350 men sent to her at Sheerness in one draft, not one of whom had ever been at sea before. Another line-of-battle ship sailed from England for the Baltic with only *eight* able

Happily we did not on that occasion encounter even Russia in any real action at sea. Had we done so, my fears might have been realised, ship for ship, unless the Russian crews were no better than our own.

However, when the war closed in May, 1855, I was equally astonished at the *wholesale* discharge from our service of men who had then really become good seamen. I thought, and still think, however much I may be opposed to large standing armaments, that we might then, and at a small expense to the country, have retained those of the skilled seamen and gunners who were ready and willing to form a Reserve. We, however, did not do so, but indiscriminately discharged our best men, greatly to their annoyance and not to our gain, although, happily, no war has intervened. But we have had since then rumours of war, more especially in 1858 and 1861, and again in 1870, when we found it necessary or desirable to supplement our reduced peace force,* and to enlist very inferior men at a greatly enhanced cost, and had we unfortunately been involved in another war, we should have been in no better position than we were in 1854. Certainly those of our continuous service men, who, in 1856, were disposed to remain in the service, should at least have been retained, if for no other purpose than to form a nucleus for our Reserves, which to a greater or less extent we must always maintain.

The difficulties of obtaining seamen in 1858 led, in the following year, to the appointment of a Royal Commission

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seamen out of a crew of 850 men! I may add that to satisfy the men serving at the time in the fleet, it was found necessary to grant half bounty to them all.

* In 1858, when war was suddenly declared between France and Austria, and when we found it expedient to considerably strengthen our fleet, we required to pay a bounty of £10 to able and £6 to ordinary seamen to enlist from the Merchant Service into the Navy, and even then only obtained 3,000, while the bounty caused great dissatisfaction to the seamen already employed in our ships of war.

"On Manning the Navy." To the proceedings of that Commission, of which I was a member, and its results, I shall refer in the following Chapter at greater length than I might otherwise have done, for, although there had been various inquiries, by order of the Admiralty, or with the sanction of Parliament, it was the first Royal Commission specially appointed to investigate the subject of Manning and Reserves.

MANNING COMMISSION OF 1859.

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CHAPTER III.

THE object of the Royal Commission of 1859 was "to inquire into the best means of Manning the Navy, and in what manner, and under what arrangements, seamen may be readily obtained for such purpose either during peace or in case of sudden emergency of war;" and "as to the way in which the valuable services of the Mercantile Marine and the seafaring population of the United Kingdom may be rendered more readily and willingly available when required for the Naval Service."

This Commission, of which Lord Hardwicke was chairman, examined a great many witnesses, nearly all of whom were eminently qualified to render advice, and, after duly considering the evidence, made various recommendations.

Reviewing with care the different branches of the service, even to its most minute details, and the requirements of the Navy in peace and war, the Commissioners were of opinion, that while there was little or no difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of men for the ordinary wants of Her Majesty's Naval Service, there were few or no reliable means for increasing that number; and that this country should have a Reserve of 60,000 men for an emergency, all of whom could be made available within a few months after the declaration of war. Consequently, the Commissioners recommended the creation of a new Reserve Force, to be drawn from the merchant service, which they styled Royal Naval Volunteers (since known

as the Royal Naval Reserve), to consist of 20,000 men, "who will never be long absent from the ports from which they hail;" and their number the Commissioners thought could be easily obtained from the coasting and short-voyage trades, embracing the trades to North America, the Baltic, and Mediterranean.

The inducements for men to join the proposed force were to be (1) a payment at short periods; (2) a pension at the age of 50 to 55; (3) payment for time spent in practice; (4) admission to the Coastguard; and (5) participation in the benefits of Greenwich Hospital. That is to say, each man was to receive a retaining fee of £5 per annum, and the State was also to contribute a further sum of £1 per annum, which would secure to those men who continued in the service "a pension of not less than £12 at the age of 50, of £15 at from 52 to 53, and £18 at 55." When at drill, which they were required to be for one month each year, they were to receive the same scale of pay, and other allowances, as the seamen engaged in the Navy, besides the other advantages just named.

The Commissioners were of opinion "that no great reliance could be placed upon the Naval Coast Volunteers for manning the fleet in case of emergency," arising from the fact that they were "not seamen in the true acceptation of the term, but boatmen, fishermen, and along-shore men," and more especially as they could not, by the articles of their agreement, be called upon to serve at a greater distance than 100 leagues from our shores; nevertheless, as they were "tolerable gunners, and would be useful for coast defence or for service in port," the Commissioners, strange to say, thought it would be advisable to increase this force to 10,000 men.

The Royal Naval Reserve has materially superseded the prior Reserve, known as the Naval Coast Volunteers, which it was found included men in every trade and profession, except that for which they were retained, and

many of whom were of no trade or profession whatever, having no regular place of abode except the county gaol or local prison, where they were too frequently found when their period for drill-muster arrived.

The Commissioners further recommend that the Coastguard should be increased to 12,000 men; that the reliefs of seamen in the home ports should not be less than 4,000; that 6,000 marines should be embodied on shore, ready for service afloat, and that it was advisable to have a further Reserve of 5,000 short-service pensioners belonging to that valuable corps, as well as 3,000 short-service seamen pensioners—men who had retired after ten years' service on a pension of 6d. per day, thus constituting a Reserve Force of 60,000 men at the estimated annual cost of £598,821.* Though the result, if not the object, of all commissions seems to be to increase expenditure, I should not have objected to even this large addition to our Naval Estimates; nor would it have been too much to pay, even if it did no more than afford relief from the panics which prevail, to a greater or less extent, at every rumour of

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* This annual cost was made up as follows:—

Increased allowance of provisions ...	£42,331	
Pensions of warrant officers' widows ...	19,150	
Mess utensils, clothes, and bedding ...	14,200	
Instruction and training-ships ...	15,918	
Petty officers' badges...	6,833	
Pay and pensions for gunnery ...	6,239	
		£104,671
2,000 additional Coastguardmen ...		116,525
4,000 reliefs in home ports		132,000
5,000 short-service pensioners' Marines		45,625
20,000 Royal Naval Volunteers (15,000 from Merchant Service on home, and 5,000 on distant voyages), including the cost of school-ships		200,000
Total		£598,821

war. But while agreeing with my colleagues in many of their recommendations, I felt that their scheme was based upon precarious foundations, and that it was not "really fitted to effect their object."* More reliable means, and "measures of a more rigorous and decided character" appeared to me to be necessary: (1) I thought that my colleagues did not sufficiently realise the fact, that steam had entirely changed the mode in which naval warfare would in future be conducted; (2) that as we were essentially a maritime people, and as our chief safeguard lay in our superiority at sea, I thought that a larger proportion of our military force should "consist of men competent to serve either afloat or on shore, who should, in fact, be a sort of naval militia, trained to the management of guns and to some of the more essential parts of a seaman's duty;" (3) that by garrisoning our sea-ports with men thus trained, we should have a very powerful and efficient reserve of gunners for our ships, whose places on shore could, on the emergency of war, be filled with either soldiers or militia, and their places in turn, in the inland towns, filled by the Volunteers. Thus while utilising to great advantage the services of that large and spirited force, we should not require to retain so many seamen in reserve, and (4) that the reserve of seamen from the Merchant Service which they proposed would not be easily obtainable unless we invited their officers to enrol in the Reserve, and would be of little service unless we had a sufficient number of competent men to command them.

The last is the only one of my suggestions which has been carried into effect. Although this portion of the scheme has proved unsatisfactory from the fact that these officers seldom attend drill, and have not made themselves efficient in their duties, I felt that, however great the

* See "Letter from W. S. Lindsay to the Earl of Hardwicke: Remarks Appended to the Report of the Commissioners," 1859.

inducement, the entries from the Merchant Service for the first five years were so slow as to be altogether insignificant; and it was only after Government decided on admitting officers from the Merchant Service, conferring upon them an honorary distinguishing mark, that the Royal Naval Reserve became a force of importance. But even still, as I shall now endeavour to show, it is in some respects more imposing than real, and is entailing annually on the country a larger cost than its efficiency in the hour of need—*for which alone it was created*—would justify.

But had the recommendations of the Commissioners been fully carried out, and had we been enabled to secure Reserves on whom we could rely, our force of men, while it would have been greater than we should have required for the number of suitable ships we could commission on the first outbreak of war, would still have been small in proportion to the number of men retained by either France or Germany for the purpose of manning, on an emergency, their ships of war. In the Crimean campaign, France, though insignificant as a naval power, had 63,000 officers and men in active service; and in the recent German war she had close upon 68,000 (29,000 of whom were employed in the defence of Paris), besides 28,500 *Marines*, or colonial soldiers, exclusive of 13,000 left in the colonies—in all, an amphibious force of one sort and another of no less than 109,500 men.

Germany has resolved to be a maritime power of no mean consideration, and although she may not be able to effect her object in this respect any more than France has done, we must remember that many of her people, like our own, but unlike the French, are devotedly fond of maritime pursuits, and by utilising this partiality for the sea, she might, if her Government cared to incur the expense, be made almost as powerful at sea as she is now on land.

Our present First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Ward Hunt) and our President of the Board of Trade (Sir Charles Adderley) seem to entertain this opinion, as they recently visited that country to inquire into the mode of training its seamen, and the means whereby its Reserves were to be secured; and although its system might not be applicable to this country in all its details, as it involves the adoption of principles we have hitherto ignored, it may be useful to state what the Germans are doing, as recently related by a writer in the *Standard*, who has evidently made himself thoroughly familiar with this subject. "Kiel," he remarks, "has been chosen for the training establishment for seamen for the German Navy, and there lads are entered, after passing a severe medical examination, between the ages of 15 and 17 years. The term of training is three years, at the expiration of which time the apprentices are enrolled as seamen in the War Marine if found qualified, and in return for the tuition they have received they are expected to engage for nine years' service. As a rule, those who have completed their three years at Kiel give promise on examination of making good seamen, while those who are backward are allowed to remain for another year, and should they fail at the expiration of that time, they are compelled to take three years' military service. During their stay at Kiel, the apprentices are not treated as if under naval discipline, but more as scholars. Their pay is about 12s. a-month, out of which they have to provide their clothing, and it is calculated that the pocket-money which remains to them is about 7d. a-week. The sea-going training arrangements for the present year have been somewhat altered, owing to some of the vessels being recently dispatched to the Mediterranean, but the programme was to send the young seamen of 1876 for cruises in two brigs, the *Undine* and *Musquito*, while those of 1875 were to go in the corvette *Nymphe*. The corvettes *Arcona* and *Preussicher Adler*

were to cruise with apprentices in the Baltic and North Sea respectively, while the frigate *Niobe* was to embark cadets of 1876, and the ironclads *Kaiser*, *Deutschland*, *Friedrich Karl*, and *Kron Prinz* were to be formed into a squadron for evolutionary exercises. It will thus be seen that, having regard to the present strength of the German Navy, a very large proportion was detailed for training purposes. On passing into the Navy as a seaman, pay at the rate of £1 per month is granted, and after three years' service an additional payment of £2 is made for each consecutive twelve months served until the maximum monthly pay of about £1 8s. is reached. Before advancing a seaman to the lowest petty officer's grade, quartermaster, he must have served afloat for four years and hold a certificate of superior knowledge of every branch of a seaman's duty on board a man-of-war. To become a second-class petty officer, a man must have served six years at sea, during one of which he must have held the rating of quartermaster, and have been captain of a gun. He then is given the grade of 'bootsmanns-maat,' or second master of manœuvres of the second class. And if he obtain a special certificate at the gunnery school, he may be rated 'feuerwerks-maat,' a kind of gunner's mate. Non-commissioned officers of Marines are also enabled to reach this grade if embarked for two years, and can pass the examination required. There are also higher grades which can be reached after longer service, but pay in every case is much lower than that of similar grades in the British Navy. It will be seen that the system of advancement of seamen and petty officers is provided for according to strict regulations, and it would be impossible, however deserving a man might be, to give him such rapid promotion to the higher petty officer's grades as is frequently the case in our own Navy, where the captain of a ship has the power of selecting men to fill those posts for which he may think them best fitted. There is much

to be said in favour of so complete a set of rules and regulations on this subject, for while greater freedom in the exercise of selection may prove of value in cases of special merit, yet it may be the means of leaving many men without a fair share of the rewards of the service, and render them discontented and anxious to obtain their discharge."

Notwithstanding the vote of £210,000 for the Royal Naval Reserve, created under the Act which carried into effect the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1859, we are still—though much in advance of what we have hitherto been—2,000 men short of the number ordered to be enrolled in that force, of whom fully one-half are said to be in Great Britain, and presumed to be immediately available; but this may be questioned.

Though 40,842 men have entered the Royal Naval Reserve since the Act came into operation, 14,140, with all the advantages offered, have not applied to be re-enrolled, and only 730 men have, during that time, joined the Navy. So far as regards the Coast Volunteers, now consisting chiefly of fishermen and other boatmen, we could not at present muster more than 1,000; nor could we depend on a greater number of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers! but I must add that we have 6,000 Marines in barracks—a most valuable drilled force, on whom we could depend—and 4,000 Coastguardmen who, with their 200 officers, are really first-class seamen, not inferior, even in this respect, to the great majority of those who are enrolled in the Royal Naval Reserve.

By the courtesy of the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen, I am enabled to give in detail the number of seamen who have been entered since the Act came into operation, and how they have been disposed of, bringing the return down to the 30th of June last:—

			First Class.	Second Class.	Totals.
Number of Seamen who have since the Act came into operation applied to be inrolled	- -	- -	40,654	6,696	47,350
Deduct—					
Rejections for physical or professional incapacity - - - - - -	First. 5,172	Second. 663			
Claims accepted, but certificates RV 2 not applied for - - - - -	568	—			
Claims outstanding and under consideration - - - - - -	62	43			
			5,802	706	6,508
Number of men enrolled - - - - -	- -	- -	34,852	5,990	40,842
Deduct men who have—	First.	Second.			
Been discharged - - - - -	5,549	165			
Died - - - - - -	2,853	88			
Joined the Royal Navy - - - -	694	36			
Not applied to be re-inrolled - - -	14,140	1			
Been promoted from 2nd to 1st class -	—	239			
			22,236	529	22,765
Actual strength of the force, 1876 - - - - -			12,616	5,461	18,077

Ages.	First Class.	Second Class.	Totals.
From 20 to 25 years	2,405	3,798	6,203
„ 26 to 30 „	4,001	1,316	5,317
„ 31 to 35 „	3,079	347	3,426
„ 36 to 40 „	1,951	—	1,951
Above 40 years -	1,180	—	1,180
	12,616	5,461	18,077
Average age - -	Yrs. Ms. 31 2	Yrs. Ms. 24 10	Yrs. Ms. 29 3

In the first class there are men with—	
Masters' certificates of competency -	82
Mates' „ „ -	653
Masters' certificates of service - -	—
Mates' „ „ -	6
P. O. ratings in the Merchant Service -	4,449
Total Number Drilled.	
First class - - - - - -	12,083
Second Class - - - - -	5,187
Total - - - - -	17,270

Whereabouts.	First Class.	Second Class.	Totals.
Estimated to be in the coasting trade and at home - - - -	6,495	4,360	10,855
On leave—			
For long voyages	220	48	268
„ short „	5,541	998	6,539
			6,807
Men left abroad on account of sickness, desertion, &c. - - -	360	55	415
Total - - - - -	12,616	5,461	18,077

Who are expected home—	First Class.	Second Class.	Totals.
Within 1st month	4,645	832	5,477
„ 2nd „	340	57	397
„ 3rd „	197	49	246
„ 4th „	159	27	186
„ 6th „	200	33	233
„ 12th „	220	48	268

We are, no doubt, in a much better position now, so far as regards Reserves, than we were at any other period of our history; but we are still short of the number the Commission of 1859 recommended, to the extent of 2,000 Royal Naval Reserve men, 8,000 Coastguardsmen, and 11,000 short-service seamen, and Naval Coast Volunteers; and presuming that we have at present in our home ports the

4,000 "relief seamen," and the 5,000 short-service pensioners from the Marines fit for active service, we still require 21,000 men to make good the number the Commissioners, after mature consideration, were of opinion we ought to have.

However, considering the number and class of men at our disposal when our fleets were triumphant on every sea, it would be idle to argue, as some writers do, knowing the pluck and energy of our people and their superiority at sea over those of all other nations, that we are now in an unsafe position, or that it is *absolutely* necessary to make good the 60,000 Reserves recommended by the Commissioners in 1859. Indeed, so far as regards our naval peace establishment, we never had a finer nor a better set of drilled men than we have at present, while the training-ships under the Admiralty, maintained solely at Government expense, supply, without the aid of the Merchant Service, all the vacancies in our peace force; *but they do no more.* Whether the scheme now in operation is the most economical and most politic mode of supplying existing wants is a question into which I shall hereafter enquire; in the meantime, I wish to impress upon my readers the fact that, as compared with former periods of our history, we are *thus far* in a more satisfactory position than ever we were.

In confirmation of this opinion, I must ask my readers to refer back to the second chapter. A careful study of the facts therein brought under notice will show that the number of men supposed to be secured by the press-gang was a delusion, and that the coasting trade having been an all-important "nursery" for the seamen who manned our ships of war was a pleasing but popular error.

No doubt we obtained from coasting vessels, and especially colliers, some very brave and most valuable men during our great wars, many of whom distinguished themselves by their indomitable valour. These, and the

seamen who had been trained in the Royal Navy, constituted the leading men in the old wars. They served as boatswains, coxswains, captains of guns, or tops, and so forth, and together with our commissioned and warrant officers, and above all, being under the command of Admirals whose names are now renowned in history, they were chiefly instrumental in the extraordinary success which attended our naval engagements; but the bulk of the crews were landsmen, men who had never been trained to the sea, or of those who had experience only in boats. A very large number, however, consisted of the sweepings of our gaols and other worthless characters, and though they could and did fight when brought up to the mark by the trained seaman in charge of the guns, they must, considering the trouble Lord Nelson had with them, and the vast number of desertions, have been, in a great measure, a very depraved lot of men. It should further be borne in mind that this state of things continued until a very recent period; indeed, it embraced, as I have shown, the Crimean war.

For these reasons I, without hesitation, state that we are in a better position now than we ever were.

But considering our vastly increased wealth, our immense fleets of unprotected merchantmen, our extensive colonies and possessions, and, above all, the greatly increased rapidity of action, combined with the entirely different mode in which future wars will be conducted, not a few of my readers may consider that we are still in an unsatisfactory position so far as regards our requirements in the event of war, or when compared with the armaments of other nations.

Various causes have tended to prevent the enrolment of Reserves to the number recommended, and some of these must be deep-rooted prejudices against the Royal Navy, or the inducements offered by the Commissioners would surely have produced the full complement of men.

Not the least of these were the ill-usage to which they were subjected on board of ships of war, and the stories of the villainous conduct of the press-gangs, whose proceedings having been handed down from generation to generation have not yet been altogether eradicated from the minds of our seafaring population.

But while these are passing away, and our Navy is in a very satisfactory position to what it was, I must impress upon my readers the fact that we have not a sufficient number of skilled or trained men in our *Merchant Service* to fall back upon to increase our existing Reserves, which we should assuredly require to do in the event of a great or prolonged war.

Our fleets of merchantmen, it is true, are far greater than ever they were—as great almost as the fleets of all other nations combined—and in these somewhere about 410,000 persons are now to be found following so-called seafaring pursuits; but they are *not* seamen.* Nor are

* In the British Mercantile Marine there were, in October, 1874, from a careful computation made by the late Registrar-General of Seamen, about 407,000 persons manning ships coming to or from the United Kingdom. This does not include seamen manning British ships in the colonies and abroad that do not come to our shores. These 407,000 men he classified as follows:—

1. Certificated masters and mates	38,200
2. Certificated engineers	7,600
3. Uncertificated masters and petty officers ...	10,000
4. Fishermen	150,000
5. Other sailor men	151,200
6. Firemen, stokers, &c.	14,000
7. Stewards, &c.	5,000
8. Apprentices	11,000
9. Other boys in merchant ships serving afloat	7,000
10. Boys in fishing boats	18,000

The annual "waste" of these numbers was, as far as he could ascertain, 16,000 men; that is to say, not that 16,000 seamen die every year, but that, including deaths, invalidings, desertions, and retirements from the sea service, about 16,000 men go out of the British Mercantile Marine every year.

they all—far from it—British subjects. No doubt we have always had a large number of foreign seamen in our Merchant Service, some of them very good men; but the best of these men now remain with their own ships, or in their own country, and a large proportion of those we now obtain are the worst description of foreigners.

The sad mutinies on board of the *Lennie* and the *Caswell* reveal, with terrible conspicuousness, the state of too many of the crews of our merchantmen, and the kind of men we are too frequently obliged to engage. To their improvement we must look before we can hope to obtain any increase in our Reserves for the Royal Navy. The crews of the *Lennie* and *Caswell* were, no doubt, and it is sincerely to be hoped they were, great exceptions to the general rule; but British sailors, while they have decreased in number in proportion to our ships, and deteriorated in seamanship, have not improved either morally or socially to the same extent as other classes of the community, or to what might have been anticipated, considering the progress of knowledge and the means which have been placed at their disposal. Nor have they, I fear, improved in their habits of economy and sobriety, arising in a great measure from the fact that while legislation, on the one hand, has of late years made extraordinary efforts to provide for their comfort and safety at sea and their well-being and protection on shore, it has, on the other, by maintaining, contrary to the usage in all other branches of trade, the pernicious system of advance notes, encouraged extravagance as well as immorality and vice, and above all promoted the one great proverbial failing of British seamen, drunkenness, and that, too, at the very time (on leaving port) when sobriety is most essential for the safety of the property under their charge and the preservation of life. Considering their increased pay, and greatly superior provisions and accommodation, it was only natural to expect that there would have been

corresponding improvements in themselves. But besides maintaining, to the injury of all parties, the pernicious system of advance notes, we have neglected their education and their training, and to these causes may be attributed most of the difficulties which now exist, both as regards their inefficiency in the Merchant Service and the scarcity of supplies to constitute what the Commission considered ample War Reserves for the Royal Navy.

Within the last few years labour has been so scarce that this no doubt, combined with the demand for shipping which existed a year or two ago, has increased the scarcity of seamen, who found more remunerative employment on shore, either as riggers and stevedores, or as labourers in mines, at home and abroad. These causes are, however, only temporary. The true cause of the scarcity, when it exists, may be attributed chiefly to the fact that we are not training, in an efficient manner, a sufficient number of boys for service at sea; even in the present very depressed state of shipping, there is not anything like a full supply of *really good seamen* who know their duty, and are ready to perform it.

The natural avidity of our youths for seafaring pursuits is as great now as it ever was; but we have abolished all means of encouraging, or even of securing, the necessary training. We now engage boys for the voyage instead of, as formerly, for a term of years, and though neither the employer nor employed may think so, *the custom we now pursue is alike detrimental to the interests of both*, while it has swept away what ought to be, in a country like this, the chief reliable means of national defence. Now these, by some means or other, must be restored, if we hope to maintain our high maritime position. How that is to be done is a question very difficult of solution, but it is one of no ordinary importance to us—far more so than to any other nation.

To this question the recent Royal Commission on

Unseaworthy Ships, directed its attention as a part of the subject into which its members had to inquire—viz., the supply of well-trained lads for the Merchant Service, and the development and maintainance of the Naval Reserve. They tacitly admitted that the system of compulsory apprenticeship, abolished in 1849, and which many shipowners desired to restore, although opposed by others interested in steamships, had been the means of securing for the Merchant Service a supply of trained seamen, and they add that "the increased employment of steamers has diminished the opportunities for training sailors," and that "although steam vessels engaged in the coasting trade, and in short voyages, attract many of the best men, they train up few for the service."

They remark that different schemes had been suggested to supply this acknowledged evil: firstly, compulsory apprenticeship; secondly, training-ships; thirdly, a combination of both schemes. "This last plan," they state, "may be understood from the following outline," which I give at length:—

"It is proposed that every vessel above 100 tons register, whether propelled by sail or steam, should be required to carry apprentices in proportion to her tonnage (the number to be fixed hereafter), or to pay a small contribution annually (such as 6d. per ton register); this sum to be applied towards the maintenance of training-ships in all the principal ports of the United Kingdom. The apprentices should, it is said, be indentured at or about the age of fourteen to the master of the training-ship for five years, and after serving in this ship for one or two years, the indenture should be transferred to any shipowner who would be willing to take the apprentice, and with whom the apprentice might be willing to serve until the completion of his term. In order that these training-ships might fit boys for service at sea, a small vessel should, it is suggested, be attached to each ship, so that,

with other instruction, the habit of a sea-life might be acquired. These school-ships should be inspected, and receive grants from the State according to their efficiency.

"In the Report of the Commission on Manning the Navy, in the year 1859, training-ships were proposed to be maintained at the public expense.

"The cost of every boy so trained was estimated at £25 a-year. This sum would be increased by the additional cost of sailing tenders, and without this preparation for a sea-life shipowners would not so readily take the boys.

"The system of apprenticeship undoubtedly affords the best means of training boys for a service in which fitness can only be acquired during early life, and if shipowners were willing to contribute, as suggested above, it would, in our opinion, be a wise policy for the Government to aid these industrial schools of the Mercantile Marine.

"Some of the most respectable shipowners take apprentices, and from among these apprentices they frequently choose officers, so that this system must have worked well. It is said, however, to be a drawback to the system that there is a practical difficulty in getting quit of a disorderly and worthless apprentice. As it is desirable to encourage the system of apprenticeship, this inconvenience should be remedied.

"As this scheme for schools and apprentices must depend upon the support which it may receive from the shipowners, we have not entered further into the details of the plan. The number of lives entrusted to British ships, and the annual value of property afloat, impress us with the importance of securing, so far as possible, not only that the ships shall be seaworthy, but that seamen shall also be well trained and disciplined for the Merchant Service.

"The system of training boys for the Royal Navy has been successful, and if a somewhat similar plan could be

adopted for the Mercantile Marine the sailors and ship-owners would be benefited, while many sources of danger to the Merchant Service would be diminished or removed."

I have now brought under the notice of my readers, in as brief a form as is consistent with perspicuity, all the plans which have been adopted, or submitted for consideration, by Commissioners and other official persons appointed to inquire into the question of manning during the last two centuries. From these a good deal of useful information may be obtained, such, indeed, as may enable persons interested in this important national question (and who is not?) to render their aid in supplying what is still required.

Hereafter I shall examine the recent proposals of the Commissioners on Unseaworthy Ships, which have not yet been adopted; nor, so far as I am aware, have they been fully considered by Government. In dealing with the great social question of what is to be done with our "street arabs," or with other destitute boys, who, if not dealt with and educated, must become a pest to society, I shall *endeavour* to show (though I am aware that many of my readers entertain an entirely contrary opinion) that, without disturbing, to any material extent, the existing institutions, public or private, or increasing our present expenditure, those boys might be made valuable auxiliaries to our Merchant Service, and the number of trained seamen retained in this country thus increased to an extent that would provide at all times, and under any circumstances, ample Reserves for the Royal Navy when their services were there required.

REPORT COMMISSION ON UNSEAWORTHY SHIPS.

CHAPTER IV.

THE scheme suggested for the training of boys, by the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships, should not be hastily put aside. It presents the views of men of no common abilities and of great experience, legislative and practical, who, having examined numerous witnesses, favour, after mature consideration, the recommendation that "*all vessels above 100 tons register, whether propelled by sail or steam, should be required to carry apprentices in proportion to their tonnage.*" These words contain the essence of their Report, so far as regards the question of manning; and they involve a great principle, which, I think, has not yet been sufficiently scrutinised in all its bearings.

The Commissioners offer no opinion as to the number of boys to be carried by each ship, wisely preferring that that point should be fully considered by the shipowners themselves before any legislative measures are passed; no doubt they adopt this course with the conviction that all legislation when opposed to the interests of the parties concerned must be futile, except in cases where class interests ought to be rendered subservient to the public good—such, for instance, as the welfare and happiness of the people, the extension of commerce, the prosperity, safety, and defence of the nation, and, of course, the suppression of crime.

As regards the defence of the nation, the shipowners say, "We are prepared to take our part, and bear our

share in that defence as subjects of the realm; but we protest against being called upon to do more, and if it can be shown that the training of apprentices is not for our own good, but is made compulsory, so that the nation may have a reserve of seamen in the hour of need, we decline to pay even the small tax the Commissioners proposed should be levied on those of us who do not consider it for our interests to take apprentices."

Such arguments as these are unanswerable. Previously to 1850, the shipowners were obliged by law to carry one apprentice to every 100 tons, but they did not then consider the obligation a hardship, because they derived, or rather were supposed to derive, by the operation of the Navigation Laws, which were abolished in that year, a special advantage conferred upon no other class of the community. The protection of their interests by law, has since proved a delusion, and there are, I dare say, very few amongst their number who would now desire to see these laws re-enacted. However depressed the shipping interest may be at present, its enormous increase proves that our shipowners are in a better position than they were previously to 1850, and consequently more able to bear any loss, if loss there be, likely to be sustained by taking apprentices. If such be the case, the question arises, why should they object to carry apprentices now, as they did not do so before? They answer, "Things have changed, and it is not for our interest to engage them." But may not the fact of having been suddenly relieved from the obligation have something to do with the change in preferring "boys" and "ordinary" seamen to take the place of apprentices, for although no class of the community is now compelled by law to engage apprentices, every class finds it for its interest to do so. There is not a master tradesman in the kingdom—be he shipbuilder, engineer, joiner, or blacksmith—who does not take apprentices, not for the interests of the nation,

but for his own. He knows that he is training a class of young men upon whom he can depend, not merely during the term of their apprenticeship, but whose knowledge thus attained will afterwards be the chief, if not the only means of enabling him to compete successfully with other manufacturers, especially with those of foreign nations.

Trades' unions, in their desire to monopolise labour to trained men—*that is, to themselves*—stoutly oppose an increase of apprentices beyond a certain limit, because they interfere with their monopoly, and tend to reduce the price of their labour; they do so for no other reason (except when they are required to train them without being paid for it), and that reason is diametrically opposed, not merely to the interests of their employers, but to the interests of the nation, which consist in having the largest amount of skilled labour at a fair cost, not enhanced by a monopoly.

The question, however, of apprenticeship is one with which the Legislature in no way interferes, leaving every shipbuilder, joiner, or engineer, to engage, for a certain number of years, as many youths as he pleases, only taking care to provide by civil law an easy remedy for masters and apprentices alike who vitiate their indentures or agreements. Beyond that, Government has really no right to interfere with the shipowners or with any other class of the community. Indeed it would be a monstrous injustice, I say nothing about its impolicy, to compel by law the employer of labour to engage more persons of any description than are necessary for his wants. If it does not suit shipowners to engage apprentices, they will not engage them; and it would be wrong to compel them for the purposes of the State, or for any other purposes whatever beyond their own wants, to take more at their own cost than they require.

When these requirements are ascertained, we may then

be enabled to settle equitably a question which of late years has been one of much controversy, and where not a few, somewhat wild and erroneous, opinions have been expressed.

Here it may be alike interesting and instructive to remark that in 1845, when the amount of British tonnage was not one-half of what it is now, there were no less than 15,704 apprentices enrolled in that year, but in 1850, when the Act repealing the Navigation Laws came into operation, and when shipowners were no longer required by law to carry apprentices, the number enrolled fell to 5,055. The publication of the Board of Trade returns, from which I obtain this information, has been continued, and the latest issued* furnishes the following information :—

On the 31st December, 1870, there were		18,303	indentures	in existence
On the 31st December, 1871	,,	17,092	,,	,,
On the 31st December, 1872	,,	16,539	,,	,,
On the 31st December, 1873	,,	15,815	,,	,,
On the 31st December, 1874	,,	15,812	,,	,,

As shipowners, however, since the apprenticeship law was abolished, have not been required to provide any return of the number of apprentices they carried, or produce their indentures to the superintendent when clearing for sea, I thought the above return must include *boys* as well as apprentices, and as it did not furnish me with the information I required, I wrote to the Registrar-General of Seamen, who, with his usual promptitude and courtesy, replied :—

"On the 31st December, 1872, there were on the books 16,359 enrolled apprentices.

"In the year 1872 there is good reason to believe that there were at sea—

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* Tables showing the progress of British Merchant Shipping, ordered to be printed on the motion of Mr. Edward Stanhope, 8th February, 1876.

			Apprentices.		Boys.
In 10,600	sailing ships	under 100 tons ...	2,082	...	3,527
In 8,558	,,	100 tons and above	7,885	...	2,087
In 663	steamships	under 100 tons ...	1	...	204
In 2,040	,,	100 tons and above	76	...	1,047
21,861			9,494		6,865

This shows a difference between the apprentices on the books and those employed of 7,045, some part of whom may be found in the fishing boats, of which we have no returns. The remainder are probably 'deserters' or 'dead,' of whom we have had no report.

"Of 300 vessels employed in 1876, taken at random (50 of each of the following tonnages), the result is not very different from the foregoing, viz.:—

Tonnage.	Apprentices.	Boys.	Total.
100 to 200	8	20	28
200 to 400	27	10	37
400 to 600	54	18	72
600 to 800	24	22	46
800 to 1000	58	20	78
Above 1000	93	37	130
	264	127	391

"Taking, then, the figures of 1872 as accurate, we have in ships of more than 100 tons burden 10,595 apprentices and boys at sea, and the adoption of either of the tables enclosed herewith as a basis for legislation would add materially to their numbers, and would not, probably, be unduly irksome to the shipowner.

"Greatly as I desire to see a system of training-ships worked out for a supply of seamen for the Mercantile Marine no less than for the Royal Navy, I feel convinced all systems will fail unless combined in some form with apprenticeship, and to carry out the latter successfully it will be necessary that the owner, master and boy should have an interest in the arrangement.

"The class of *boys* has no doubt greatly increased of late years, and tends to demoralisation.

"The system of apprenticeship is based on the principle that the apprentice shall repay at the latter part of his service, when he becomes valuable, what he cost his master in the earlier part of his time, when he was valueless. But in practice, we know it too frequently happens that when an apprentice finds he is working for his master while boys in the same ship are earning good wages for themselves, he puts an end to his indenture by deserting, and, having once become infected with the disease, there is danger that it may become chronic. What seems to be necessary to counteract these evils is the creation of a mutual interest in the three parties to the bargain.

"The points to be aimed at appear to be—

"(1.) Sufficient inducement for the apprentice to stick by the ship and serve out his time.

"(2.) Sufficient inducement for the master and owner to overcome their present unwillingness to look after the welfare of the apprentices when in port.

"Unless we can satisfy these conditions, I have no great hope that the apprentices will be forthcoming when wanted for imperial purposes, and their need for imperial purposes is the only justification which can be pleaded for expending national money in their training. The former condition might perhaps be met by kind treatment, good food, and wages somewhat near his market value being offered to the apprentice. The latter by the remuneration of the master being made in some way dependent on his being successful in retaining the apprentices in the service of the ship."

The figures, supplied by the Registrar-General, furnish the amount of the shipowners' wants so far as regards apprentices. If the State compels them, without an

equivalent, to engage more, they would be justified in resisting any such measure, for, should the State require more, either for the Royal Navy or for Reserves, or for any other purpose whatever, it would be the duty of the State to provide them solely at its own expense.

I hope I have now clearly defined the *basis* on which I think all future schemes for manning should in equity be framed.

But before I attempt to raise any fabric on the basis I have named, I desire to address a few words specially to the shipowners, and I hope they will not take it amiss from one of themselves, who has throughout a long life devoted himself earnestly to their interests, though not always in harmony with their views at the time, and who has no interests to serve beyond their own, and the good of this great maritime country.

May I therefore be allowed to ask; Is it for their own interest to engage, to the extent they do, boys casually for the voyage, instead of for a term of years? I know I shall be met with the answer, "Of course it is, or we should increase the number of apprentices beyond what we at present employ. And what is the use of beating about the bush with such facts before you as those you have named?"

Well, I must beat about the bush, for it requires beating about, as I am not aware that the truly important subject of manning has ever been earnestly and logically examined.

Shipowners say that they take boys for the voyage because they do not require to maintain them on shore when the voyage is ended; and that after they have borne the expense of training apprentices for the first year or two of their indentures, when they are of comparatively little use to them, these apprentices desert just when they are becoming useful.

These are, no doubt, stubborn facts, but cannot

the evils of which shipowners justly complain be remedied? Why do apprentices desert? They do so because, after they have been two years, or, perhaps, only one year at sea (and seldom for any other reason), they can obtain, as "ordinary seamen," 30s. or 40s. per month; whereas, as the Registrar-General of Seamen, in substance, justly remarks, they would not, under the conditions of their indentures, receive for the second or third year of their apprenticeship, one-half that amount of remuneration. Unfortunately, when apprentices meet youths of their own age, especially in our colonial ports where labour is in demand, receiving, as ordinary seamen, 40s. per month, when they are only receiving, perhaps, 15s., they overlook the fact that their employer taught them their duties when they were of little value to him, in the just expectation that he might be recouped when they grew older, and had more knowledge and experience; and, regardless of the consequences, having no object in view but their own interests, they desert the ship; but surely this can be remedied in a great measure, by the Legislature inflicting more severe punishment than is now enforced for so serious a breach of their agreement, or by shipowners taking the trouble to prosecute, which they seldom do. It is enforced, and very properly so, with the utmost rigour in all branches of trade on shore—why should it not be so in the case of dishonest apprentices engaged in seafaring pursuits.

We do not hear of master mechanics engaging half-and-half men in the different branches of their trade, such as ordinary seamen are in their avocations. The employers, as well as the skilled men, who have faithfully served their apprenticeship, are, for their own interests, alike opposed to all such engagements. The only difference between them that ever arises, is one I have already mentioned, the men object to their employers having more than a limited number of apprentices, for the very

illogical reason that too many skilled men are thus produced, who interfere with the monopoly which the existing skilled men desire to maintain.

But, let me ask the shipowners, who created ordinary seamen, or half-and-half men—who sent forth to distant ports boys to become inducements for their apprentices to desert? Why, the shipowners themselves, by preferring to take boys for the voyage, which frequently ends with the passage out, instead of apprentices for a term of years; boys who, becoming "ordinary seamen" much sooner than they ought to do, encourage their apprentices to desert to their own loss, and, I must add, to the loss of the nation, which is more interested in having trained and skilled seamen, than trained and skilled men in any other branch of commerce.

We have thus, at the present moment, through the shipowners' instrumentality alone, far too large a number of half-and-half, comparatively worthless, seamen, who are unfit for their duties in our Mercantile Marine, and who would be of little value as Reserves to the Royal Navy in the hour of need. My brother shipowners must not shelter themselves under the bush round about which I am now beating. They, I repeat, have to a large extent created the evil of which they now so loudly complain; and it is a terrible evil.

I conscientiously believe that far more vessels are lost, and that far more lives are sacrificed, through incompetent and untrained seamen than through "unseaworthy ships;" but while shipowners are to blame for having created the existing state of things, Government is now equally so, in not requiring that "sailors" incompetent for their duties shall not be allowed to proceed to sea, any more than unseaworthy ships.

If the principle of examination or certification of competency is sound in the one case, it should be more so in the other, as it is the greater evil of the two.

But if shipowners looked more closely to their real interests than they now do in such matters, the evil would soon be rectified, without the necessity of any legislative enactment; they would in their own interests engage an increased number of apprentices, and fewer boys, or so-called ordinary seamen, for the voyage, and would decline, as almost every other employer of labour does, to have any master, officer, or man who had not proved himself qualified for his duty. If they did so, the number of apprentices would soon be increased sufficiently to meet all our requirements, and obviate the evils of which they complain.

At present our shipowners engage apprentices where and as they please; but since the State, as a means of procuring honest employment for youths who were destitute, or who might otherwise become pests to society, encouraged the establishment of training-ships throughout the kingdom, supported by Treasury or educational grants, or other public funds, and by voluntary contributions, the shipowners have taken a number of apprentices, but many more boys from these vessels.

There are now ten Industrial and Reformatory School-vessels, all of which are discarded ships of war, supplied by the Government; and there were, by the latest returns 2,175 boys trained in these vessels.* As this is the most

* Training-Ships for the Merchant Service.—For Forecastle Hands.

Port where Ship is stationed.	Name of Ship.	No. on Board on 31st March 1876	How supported.	Class of Boys educated.	Average Period of training.
Bristol ...	*Formidable*...	351	Government Grant under Industrial Schools Act, 1866, local rates & subscriptions... ...	Homeless and destitute ..	2 to 3 yrs., never beyond 5 yrs.
Cardiff ...	*Havannah* ...	78	Local rates and subscriptions ...	Ditto ...	3 to 4 „
Dundee ...	*Mars*	298	Government Grant under Industrial Schools Act, 1866, and subscriptions.	Ditto ...	2 years.

(*Continued on next page.*)

important branch of my subject, I must explain, for the information of those of my readers who may not be familiar with it, that boys are sent to these Industrial School-ships under the provisions of Sections 14 to 17 of the Act 29 and 30 Vict., wherein their age and description are stated, and the conditions on which they are received.* They are all friendless youths, without parents

(*Continuation of Footnote, page 57.*)

Glasgow...	*Cumberland*	355	Ditto	Ditto ...	3 to 4 „
Hull ...	*Southampton*	198	Ditto and voluntary contributions ...	Ditto ...	Uncertain.
Liverpool	*Akbar*	188	Ditto	Reformatory boys ...	2½ to 3 yrs.
	Clarence ...	215	Government Grant, county & borough payments in aid, and voluntary contributions ...	Ditto ...	3½ years.
London:— (Purfleet)	*Cornwall* ...	225	Government allowance, payments from counties, voluntary contributions	Ditto ...	3 years.
(Grays) .	*Goliath* ... This vessel was burnt on 22nd Dec. '75, and is to be replaced by the *Exmouth*.	—	By rates from the unions of Hackney, Poplar, and Whitechapel ...	Pauper boys from unions	Uncertain.
Shields ...	*Wellesley* ...	267	Government Grant under Industrial Schools Act, and private subscriptions	Homeless and destitute ...	3 to 4 yrs.

* Classes of children to be detained in Certified Industrial Schools and Certified Industrial Training School-ships, under the Industrial Schools Act, 29 & 30 Vict., chap. 118 :—

"*Sec.* 14.—Any person may bring before two justices, or a magistrate, any child apparently under the age of fourteen years that comes within any of the following descriptions, namely :—

"That is found begging or receiving alms (whether actually or under the pretext of selling or offering for sale anything), or being in any street or public place for the purpose of so begging or receiving alms ;

or guardians, or who are beyond their control, and having no means of maintenance, would consequently be likely to fall into crime were they not provided for; but, happily, experience has shown that these homeless wanderers have turned out well, as a rule, after passing through an Industrial School. They are destitute, and consequently on the verge of crime—nay, some of them have committed crime in the eyes of the law. But who in his heart can say that these starving children, whatever the Legislature may enact for the safety and well-being of the nation, are to

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"That is found wandering, and not having any home or settled place of abode, or proper guardianship, or visible means of subsistence;

"That is found destitute, either being an orphan, or having a surviving parent who is undergoing penal servitude or imprisonment;

"That frequents the company of reputed thieves.

"The justice or magistrate before whom a child is brought, as coming within one of those descriptions, if satisfied, on inquiry, of that fact, and that it is expedient to deal with him under this Act, may order him to be sent to a Certified Industrial School.

"*Sec.* 15.—Where a child apparently under the age of twelve is charged before two justices or a magistrate with an offence punishable by imprisonment or a less punishment, but has not been in *England* convicted of felony, or in *Scotland* of theft, and the child ought, in the opinion of the justices or magistrate (regard being had to his age and to the circumstances of the case), to be dealt with under this Act, the justices or magistrate may order him to be sent to a Certified Industrial School."

"*Sec.* 17.—Where the guardians of the poor of a union, or of a parish wherein relief is administered by a board of guardians, or the board of management of a district pauper school, or the parochial board of a parish or combination, represent to two justices or a magistrate that any child apparently under the age of fourteen years, maintained in a workhouse or pauper school of a union or parish, or in a district pauper school, or in the poor-house of a parish or combination, is refractory, or is the child of parents either of whom has been convicted of a crime or offence punishable with penal servitude or imprisonment, and that it is desirable that he be sent to an Industrial School under this Act, the justices or magistrate may, if satisfied that it is expedient to deal with the child under this Act, order him to be sent to a Certified Industrial School."

be accounted criminals if they have picked up articles within their reach to satisfy the cravings of hunger.

I have before me the reports of all the Industrial School-ships; these vessels are in a great measure under the control of philanthropic men, merchants, shipowners, and others resident in the localities where they are stationed, and the results show that "destitute children" (see report) "lose any tendency to bad habits when received, and soon acquire good ones on board. They become smart, respectful, and obedient, as well as cleanly in their habits, and decorous in their language." Indeed, so far as I can trace, for I have studied almost every report on the subject, there is hardly any perceptible difference, after they are a month or two on board, between them and the boys of the labouring classes; and as I am anxious that the public should thoroughly understand this question and appreciate the true value of these institutions, I shall, at the risk of wearying my readers, furnish them with the substance of the last report of the *Cumberland*, stationed in the Clyde, as this vessel is a type of the whole.

The *Cumberland*, like all the others, is rather an out-of-date than an *old* wooden ship of war, supplied by the Admiralty. The average number of boys trained on board of her, in 1875, was 353; they included, as may be seen by the foot-note,* many of the dregs and waifs of

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* Number of boys on board at 31st December, 1875 ... 371

Father dead	68	
Mother dead	39	
Both parents dead	92	
No known father	18	
Father absconded	25	
Father absconded and mother dead	14	
Mother absconded and father dead	16	
Both parents absconded	8	
Both parents living...	91	
	—	371

society saved from destitution and crime. Out of the whole number, only 91 had both parents living, and if I could analyse who they were it would reveal a sad tale—about as sad as that of those who were parentless. What could be expected of boys thus left, unless the State, aided by men of philanthropy, came forward to save them from crime? Undoubtedly they would become a burthen to society, either as paupers, wandering about our streets, or as criminals, and thus a far heavier impost would be levied upon us for their capture, conviction, and imprisonment, than the votes now appropriated for their reform.

If we look carefully into this question as a mere matter of cost, we shall find that the country would thus sustain a much greater loss than the sum annually voted for the training, education, and maintenance of these destitute boys.* But the question is one of infinitely greater importance to the nation than mere cost, as is shown in a few words of the report of my friend Mr. James Galbraith, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the *Cumberland*, who remarks:—

"On the 31st December, 1874, 341 boys were on board the ship. There have been since admitted 163 boys. Between the boys on board at the beginning of this year (1875) and those received in the course of it, there are thus 504 boys to be accounted for at its close.

"Of these, 11 have been placed in employment on shore, 22 were returned to their friends in consequence of the circumstances of latter having improved, or for other reasons; 4 were transferred to a landward industrial

* By the last year's accounts (1875) the *Cumberland* received from the Treasury, £5,577 14s. 10d.; from local assessment, £771 6s. 9d.; from the Commissioners of the Glasgow Houses of Refuge, £850, and raised the balance necessary to cover the total expenditure (which amounted in round numbers to £8,000) by private annual subscriptions and donations.

school; 89 were sent to sea (3 of these to the Royal Navy);* 3 absconded, and 4 died; making 133 who have left the ship in 1875, leaving 371 on board at 31st December, 1875.

"The average number of boys on board during 1875 was 353.

"Since the establishment of the *Cumberland* in June, 1869, 1,035 boys have been admitted, and 661 have left.

"The communications kept up with, and relative to the boys, for some years after leaving the *Cumberland*, show the following results as nearly as can be ascertained. Of those discharged in 1872-3-4, 266 are known to be doing well, 4 have been conducting themselves indifferently, 8 have been convicted of crime, and 20 have died, 2 of these latter having left the ship in bad health. Two hundred and seventeen of the boys discharged during these three years were sent to sea."

Supposing the remainder, of whom no accounts have as yet been received, to have conducted themselves in a similar manner, we see in this ship alone, what a number of destitute children, saved from misery and crime, have become useful members of society, whose conduct, I must add, will compare not unfavourably with a similar number of youths of almost any other class in the community.

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* The conditions on which the Admiralty receive boys from training-ships are as follow:—

"The sum of £25 will be paid to the committee of the training-ship for boys who join the Royal Navy who fulfil the undermentioned conditions:—

"1. They must have been for two entire years under training on board a training-ship, and subject to inspection by officers appointed by the Admiralty.

"2. They must be sixteen years of age, not less than 5 feet 1 inch in height, and 30 inches chest measurement; of robust frame, intelligent, sound and healthy constitution, free from physical defects or malformations, and not subject to fits.

"3. They must be able to read and write, and show satisfactory proficiency in cutlass, small arm, and gunnery drill, as well as in elementary

On this point the President of the *Cumberland*, Mr. John Burns, remarks with great force:—

"I think that the advantages of training-ships cannot be exaggerated, both upon philanthropic and national grounds. I do not think that there is the slightest danger of philanthropy and benevolence being overdone in this country, and the training-ships which within late years have been instituted have formed at once objects for charitable effort and receptacles for boys who, from many reasons, prefer a sea life to any occupation upon land: but upon the present occasion I would rather urge the necessity for training-ships *from a national point of view*, and it would be needless for me to attempt to prove the need we have for such institutions, did I not state the fact that thorough-bred seamen are upon the decrease, and must be recruited from exceptional modes of culture. In these days we hear a great deal about unseaworthy ships, and even unseaworthy shipowners; but absolutely nothing is being done to prevent unseaworthy seamen going to sea."

Besides these ten industrial school-ships, of which three—the *Akbar*, *Clarence*, and *Cornwall*—are purely reformatory, there are eight other vessels devoted to the training of youths for the sea, chiefly for the Merchant

subjects connected with navigation and seamanship, such as log, lead, compass, rowing, swimming, reefing and furling sails, steering, knotting, splicing, stropping, and rule of the road.

"4. Application for entry into the Royal Navy is to be made by the committee of the mercantile training-ship on behalf of the boy to the officer of the port or district authorised to enrol boys in the Royal Navy, and the sum of £25 will be paid on completion of the enrolment.

"5. This payment will not be made in respect of any boy brought up in a reformatory ship."

No wonder the Navy does not take, or rather get, many boys from these industrial ships when, putting aside all other considerations, the Admiralty only allow £25 for a boy who has cost from £45 to £50 for the "two years' training."

Service. These consist of the *Conway* frigate, moored on the Mersey, and the *Worcester*,* stationed on the Thames, off Greenhithe, Kent. Neither of these, however, receive any aid from Government, nor can they, in any way, be ranked with the industrial and reformatory school-ships; they are, in fact, well-conducted and excellent colleges, where the parents of youths, chiefly of the middle class, pay from forty to fifty guineas each per annum for their education and maintenance. I should like to see more of such schools established.

There are two others, the *Chichester*, established 1866, and the *Indefatigable*, in 1865; the former stationed on the Thames, the latter on the Mersey, where from 400 to 450 boys, of the labouring classes, or sons and orphans of sailors, and other poor and destitute boys, are maintained and educated for seafaring pursuits, entirely by voluntary subscriptions. In 1874, another of these vessels, the *Arethusa*, now moored off Greenhithe, was established for the benefit of homeless and destitute boys, not criminals; and she is also supported by voluntary contributions, bequests, and otherwise; none of these vessels receiving anything from Government beyond the use of the vessels.

Then we have the *Warspite*,† the pioneer training-ship, stationed off Woolwich, and established so far back as 1736, under the control of the "Marine Society." This excellent institution has been maintained throughout by bequests and voluntary subscriptions, receiving no aid from Government beyond, I believe, the use of the vessel. Here all the boys are subjected to a strict medical

* Arrangements have just been made to substitute for the *Worcester* a larger and much superior two-decked ship, the *Frederick William*.

† The *Warspite* having recently been destroyed by fire, the Marine Society is about to fit up an old wooden line-of-battle ship, placed at the disposal of the society by the Admiralty. She will accommodate a great many more boys than the *Warspite*.

examination before admission, and are engaged to serve wherever they may be sent, whether in the Royal Navy or Merchant Service. This valuable institution has sent, since its establishment, somewhere about 30,000 boys into the Royal Navy, 25,000 into the Merchant Service, and 3,700 into the Indian Navy. Boys are received into her between the age of 14 and 16, and remain, on the average, about nine months on board, training for actual sea service; they leave in turn as soon as a certain course of education has been gone through.

There is likewise the *Gibraltar*, established in 1872, and now stationed at Belfast. This vessel, which may be classed under the head of industrial school-ships, is supported by an annual grant of £1,820 from the Paymaster-General, £910 raised by various Irish counties, and about £600 by voluntary subscriptions. About 250 boys are trained in the *Gibraltar* (she has accommodation for 350). They are received between the age of 10 and 14, and are generally retained until they are 16. They may be sent out on license any time after they have been 18 months on board, but cannot be kept on board after they are 16 years of age.

Besides these seventeen training-vessels, there is the model ship *Endeavour*, consisting of the deck and masts of a vessel fully brig-rigged, erected in connection with the Feltham Industrial School, Middlesex, to which I shall presently refer; and there are six large vessels stationed at the different naval ports, where from 2,500 to 3,000 boys are annually in course of training entirely for service as seamen in the Royal Navy. These are, however, altogether under the control of the Admiralty, the others to which I have referred being almost as entirely under the management of committees of private gentlemen, belonging to the different localities where the vessels are stationed; subject only to certain regulations issued by the Board of Trade.

Although the inducements offered by the Admiralty are tempting to poor parents, as a boy on entry receives a gratuity of £5 for outfit, and £1 for bedding, the conditions on which he is entered are stringent. Originally he was received between the ages of 14 and 15, provided he was the minimum height of 4 ft. 8 in., without shoes. In 1864, the conditions required that boys of 14½ to 15 should be of that height, and 4 ft. 10 in. in height if between the ages of 15 and 16. In 1868, the Admiralty declined to receive boys under 15 years of age, and required that between that age and 15½ they should be 4 ft. 10½ in. in height, and 29 in. round the chest; if from 15½ to 16 years of age, 4 ft. 11½ in. in height; and if from 16 to 16½ years of age, they were to be 5 ft. 1 in. in height, and 30 in. round the chest, with "his hands above his head, back to back, and counting aloud between 30 and 40 each minute in a steady manner." By a circular of the 4th August, 1875, every boy was required to be not merely of "robust frame, intelligent, of perfectly sound and healthy constitution, free from any physical defects or malformation, and not subject to fits," but also "able to read and write," the lowest test being that he should "read a passage of two ordinary lines of one syllable, and sign his name legibly." It was further required that—

"Every boy must bring with him a certificate of birth, or a declaration made by his parents or guardians, before a magistrate, to show that he is of proper age; and also the consent in writing of his parents or guardians, or nearest relatives, if he be an orphan, to his entering the Navy and engaging to serve until he shall have completed ten years continuous service from the age of 18."

The last Admiralty Circular before me, that of 12th January, 1876, allows boys who can neither read nor write to enter training-ships for service in Her Majesty's vessels of war, but retains all the other conditions, and the

permanent one that "*boys are not to be received from reformatories or prisons.*" However eligible in other respects, they cannot be admitted to the service if they have once been convicted of crime of any description.

This regulation is of long standing, and, no doubt, when originally adopted, considering the experience which former Boards of Admiralty had of the "sweepings of our gaols," who on every emergency were drafted into the service of the Navy, was thought to be a precautionary, if not altogether a necessary regulation. As there is, however, a vast difference between the homeless boy who has committed some trivial offence, and the confirmed and hardened criminal, I think this long standing rule might be reconsidered to advantage. In the case of the latter, there is little hope of reform; but there is every hope for the former, as I have shown by the results of the destitute boys received on board the *Cumberland* and other training-ships.

I shall now furnish a more striking instance in favour of the views I venture to recommend to the Admiralty; and the training-vessel *Endeavour* is a remarkable case in point.

The *Endeavour*, as I have already explained, is a model vessel, erected on the grounds of the Feltham Institution, within four miles of where I reside. I have more than once had the pleasure of inspecting the 150 boys who are there under drill for sea service. This excellent institution, which has accommodation for 800 boys, although the number seldom exceeds 750, is supported by a rate levied on the county of Middlesex, yielding annually about £9,000, and contributions received from the Treasury of £6,300, and from the London School Board of £1,600. It is under the control of the magistrates of the county, who appoint from their number a Committee of Visitors, whose chairman, with the superintendent, Captain Rowland Brookes, a gentleman peculiarly suited for the

responsible office he fills, and the chaplain, practically manage the institution with marked ability.*

The Middlesex Industrial School, when established in 1859, under a Local Act, 17 and 18 Vict., c. 169, was in effect meant to be a prison for the vagrant boys of Middlesex, especially of London, who had been convicted of crime rather than for the purpose of a school; but the number of *convicted* boys now consists of only one-seventh of the whole, the remaining six-sevenths being youths sent under the power of the Industrial Schools Act, which provides for detention without conviction, while a large proportion of the present inmates are simply *truant* children sent at the instance of the London School Board, because their parents cannot control them and make them go to school. Consequently, the institution is no longer a prison, but a reformatory and compulsory school as is shown by the fact that its inmates, though allowed great freedom in their movements, seldom desert—I might say almost never—except when enticed away by, or through the instrumentality of, their depraved parents or others. The boys are received at the age of ten, and maintained until they are sixteen, but not later;† they have then learned some branch of trade‡ and are fit to do for themselves.

Perhaps in no part of the world can there be found a more depraved class of boys—"street Arabs," as they have been appropriately called—than in the city of London. The Feltham Institution may, therefore, be said to receive, shelter, train and educate the very dregs

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* See Annual Report of the Committee of Visitors of the Industrial School at Feltham, 1876.

† See Parliamentary Paper, "Training-Ships," ordered, on the motion of Captain Bedford Pim, R.N., to be printed 24th July, 1876.

‡ The following table, from the Report of the Committee, shows the number of boys instructed in trades, &c., during the year ending 31st December, 1875 :—

of society, most of whom would soon be irretrievably steeped in crime, were they not thus saved from ruin and from becoming a nuisance to society. It would be difficult to find anywhere else human nature at so low an ebb, morally, socially, and physically, as a large number of these homeless waifs present when first admitted to the Feltham Institution; yet mark the results—they are satisfactory in the extreme. During the three years, 1872 to 1874, inclusive, for which the last returns have been made up, there were 821 boys discharged and provided for,* of whom 82·5 per cent. are doing well, 8 per cent. dead, doubtful, and unascertained, and 9·5 per cent. have been convicted of crime, and these in the majority of

Trades, &c.	1st Quarter ending 31st March.	2nd Quarter ending 30th June.	3rd Quarter ending 30th September.	4th Quarter ending 31st December.
Tailors	34	36	34	35
Shoemakers	34	30	33	36
Carpenters	30	25	23	28
Painters	16	14	16	16
Smiths	8	6	7	7
Bricklayers	16	15	15	16
Engineers	8	7	8	9
Kitchen Boys	10	10	10	10
Bakers	7	8	7	9
Farm Boys	60	60	65	58
Brass Band Boys	36	36	36	36
Reed Band Boys	36	36	36	36
Nautical Class	100	104	100	101
Stocking Makers	—	—	4	8
Other Industrial Occupations	3	8	5	3
Total	398	395	399	408

* To employment or service	99
Placed under care of friends	165
Emigrated	121
Sent to sea or entered Royal Navy	285
Enlisted	115
Discharged on account of disease	12
Absconded, sentence expired	6
	803

cases from the 165 who were "placed under the care of friends." Out of the 285 who entered the Navy and Merchant Service, 85·9 per cent. are known to be doing well, and 61·4 per cent. are still following the sea.*

Although I do not pretend to say that all the boys in Feltham School, who are training for the sea, are the best that could be obtained for the purposes of the Royal Navy, they should not be altogether ignored as they now are; and therefore I hope, before there is any further legislation on the question of manning the Navy, the First Lord of the Admiralty himself, with the First Sea-Lord, will visit that institution and judge for themselves as to the qualities of the youths and, of their fitness, in time, to enrol them to aid in fighting our battles. If my Lords can only be convinced of that fact, as I have been, they may render a two-fold service to their country of no ordinary importance, both as regards the social question and the means of efficiently manning our ships of war in the hour of need. There are 128,000 boys (about an equal number of girls) receiving either indoor or outdoor relief from the various parishes and unions of this country;† and I see no reason why a considerable portion of these boys, or as many of them as we require, should not be made subservient to the purposes of the Royal Navy and Mercantile Marine.

It is true, especially in the case of the Feltham School, that many of the boys in that institution do not meet the

* If the system of "apprenticeship" was adopted for that of "boys," the percentage under the head of "following the sea" would be far in excess of 61·4, for, as it is now, a boy is free at the end of a voyage, and, returning home to his friends, is often persuaded to follow some other calling, and thus the expense of his special training is lost to the country.

† See an excellent pamphlet on "Training-Ships and Training-Schools," by Edmund E. Antrobus, Esq., who was chairman of the Feltham Industrial Schools, and who has given much attention to this subject. London: Stanton and Son, Strand. 1875.

physical requirements of the Admiralty; but why those who do should not be received, now that it has been shown how little there is to fear from their conduct, I am at a loss to understand, except that the Admiralty has not made itself sufficiently conversant with the present state of this truly important question.

Considering how these destitute boys have been brought up, the majority of them having no home, sleeping in the parks or on door-steps, or under arches or by brick-kilns, and seeking the means of existence by begging or picking up what they can get in the streets, gutters, and common sewers, they are, as might be supposed, when admitted, in too many instances, a miserable-looking lot. But it is astonishing how they fill out when they have wholesome food, healthy work, and proper places of rest. They may not all, at the limited age of 16, fulfil the requirements in height and breadth of the Admiralty, but there is every reason to suppose that if they continue to be well fed and cared for, they will in time make active and valuable seamen, unless they are diseased or there is about them some inherent weakness. I have seen many of the youths who were brought up at Feltham after they reached manhood, and I could not desire to see a more cleanly, active, muscular and respectable-looking class of young men, especially those who have continued to follow seafaring or other out-door pursuits. We do not require for the Royal Navy nor for the Merchant Service over-grown Herculean men, such as the Yorkshire naavies. What we want is intelligent, active, wiry fellows, who could creep into the muzzle of a gun if needs be, or unfurl the British ensign from the truck; and these are to be found from the sources I have named. Anything beyond 5ft. 7in. in height, or 12 stone in weight, only tends to make the sailor less agile, and therefore less useful on board ship. Above 16 stone, men are worthless for working or fighting; heavy weights may carry the day in

railway excavations, or in charges at close quarters in a battle-field, but as a rule, they are in their persons an encumbrance at sea.

I have gone more into detail in regard to the Feltham institution than I should otherwise have done, were it not the case that the Admiralty have hitherto practically declined to receive from it boys into the Royal Navy, except a small number, 35 in all, during the years 1872-75, and these only because they had displayed a taste for music and were likely to become efficient bandsmen ! ! *

The truth is, the Lords of the Admiralty of to-day, as of old, are slow to change their established rules, and I fear do not sufficiently consider the progress made in our social position, nor the relative advantages of science, education, and activity as against bulk and weight.

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* Although many young men who have been trained in Feltham School are now to be found serving in the Navy as *seamen*, none have been allowed to enter direct for the purpose of being trained as such, except 19 boys who were received in the years 1861-62, and, though without the special nautical training which the institution now affords, 16, or 84 per cent., of these 19 boys were reported as "doing well" at the end of the succeeding three years. It is difficult to understand, with such facts before us, why a standing order was introduced prohibiting the entry of boys from reformatories; any such order is contrary to, and is, indeed, a protest on the part of the Admiralty against the noble exertions of the nation, now being made to educate our destitute homeless children, and raise them, if not from the pot-house to the parlour, to be industrious members of society.

OUR MARITIME DEFENCES.

CHAPTER V.

To arrive at sound conclusions on any subject, it requires to be mastered in all its details; with that object in view I have read almost everything worth reading that has been printed during the last 200 years on manning our ships; but I fear I have wearied my readers by inviting them to consider with me even the substance of my research.

Although most writers have a hobby they love to ride, or a bugbear constantly alarming them, and though even Governments are not free from these proverbial failings, there is much to be learned from the records of the past. For instance, every student of history must be convinced that any attempt to resort to the iniquitous and demoralising press-gang, as before observed, would be alike futile and dangerous. We must, therefore, banish that mode of raising men altogether from our thoughts. It was a project of an age of brute force, working wretchedly even then, and cannot now be re-introduced. While, however, opinions differ on numerous other projects, pronouncing some of them in their details worthy of adoption, and others crude and impracticable, there is one most important point on which all Governments and most writers appear to be agreed, and that is, the desirability, if not the necessity, of the Royal Navy acting in concert, or, at least, in harmony with the Mercantile Marine, so as to fill up the chasm existing between the two services, and

thus secure reserves from our only reliable resource.* We should never forget that the naval power of Great Britain is based upon her maritime resources, and that our merchant service must ever be our most trustworthy auxiliary in any lengthened war. In a word, it is the real source of our supremacy on the ocean, and all the best considered schemes I have mentioned proceeded on the basis of unity of Navy and mercantile service, although the proposed modes of effecting and preserving it have proved deficient.

Nevertheless, it is a remarkable fact that since 1852 all Governments have practically ignored it, except in attempting to derive from that source, under the recommendation of the Commission of 1859, a reserve of seamen who are periodically drilled on shore, but who seldom or never see a ship of war. This exclusive policy has for some years been fully exemplified in the "continuous service" system,† and by the establishment of training-ships devoted solely to the rearing of boys for the Royal Navy.

No doubt these systems have worked very well in peace, but the Navy is maintained as a precaution for war.‡ If

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* See "Suggestions for Improving the Character of our Merchant Seamen, and for Promoting an Efficient Naval Reserve," by Admiral the Hon. Sir F. W. Grey, published by Stanford, 1873. See also Lecture by Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N., of H.M.S. *Thunderer*, on the question, "Is the Merchant Service any Longer a Feeder to the Royal Navy?" delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, January 17th, 1876, and the speeches and writings of various other high naval authorities.

† The late Admiral Sir Charles Napier and Captain (now Admiral Sir B. J.) Sulivan on the one hand, and Mr. Howell, an intelligent warrant officer, on the other, as representatives of the two classes in the Navy, strongly objected to this system for the reasons named in their evidence before the Commission of 1859. See also an able speech delivered in the House of Commons by Sir Francis Baring on going into Committee on Naval Reserve Bill, Session 1859.

‡ "*It is a fact*," replied Captain Sulivan, to Question 2,114, Manning Commission, 1859, "*that the continuous service, however perfect, cannot give you one man for war purposes.*"

we could ensure peace it would be dispensed with altogether. But in adopting this system we have lessened our power as a maritime nation; and by ignoring thus far our Mercantile Marine, which other nations justly envy, we have lowered our position down to their level. Indeed, some portions of their schemes we copy. Having but a limited maritime population, they are obliged to raise their Reserves from the mass of the people, by training some of them to be seamen; and when we rear "country lads" specially for the Navy, we only adopt a practice which in their case is a necessity.

History tells us how signally even such a warlike genius as Napoleon I. failed in this respect. I remember well a remark of the last Napoleon, at an interview I had with him in 1861. "I can build ships," he said, "but I cannot make sailors of my people as you do of yours."* Yet we ignore the resources of the nation within our reach, and train seamen on *shore* to fight our battles in the hour of need, disregarding the fact that we have by far the largest Mercantile Marine in the world, and the most extensive means of training them afloat, both in seamanship and in the arts of naval warfare.

As I desire that what I state should be more a record of facts than a political disquisition, I pass over, in the meantime, the questionable policy of practically ignoring, as a means of Manning the Navy, the existence of our Mercantile Marine, and invite my readers, before I propose a scheme of my own, to examine with me the cost to the nation of the system now adopted by the Navy.

With this object in view, I have gone through the Navy

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* "No human being could foretell with certainty what would be the experience of a future naval war as regards the value of ironclads and other ships of war; but of this they might be certain, that without an adequate body of well disciplined and intelligent and contented seamen no ships would be of much value." See an able speech delivered by Mr. Shaw-Lefevre in Committee on Navy Estimates, 10th April, 1876.

Estimates for 1876-77, consisting of 233 closely-printed folio pages. They have greatly increased in bulk since I had a seat in Parliament. It was then no easy matter to fathom their mysteries, but now they have swelled to such a bulk that I might say of them, as the late Lord Derby once said of Bradshaw's Railway Guide, "No doubt it is a very useful book, but I never could understand it."

These estimates are replete with the most minute, but harassing details. Unfortunately, however, they appear to be very incomplete as regards the cost of particular departments. For instance, if any of my readers take the trouble to refer to vote 1, p. 7, of the Navy Estimates, "Wages, &c., to Seamen," they will find that the wages, &c., this year of 7,000 boys (4,000 on service in the fleet, and 3,000 under instruction in training-ships) are put down at £70,268; and if he be an easy, good-natured person, and not very inquisitive, he might arrive at the conclusion that this is the cost of them, and that the Admiralty manage the business with great economy. Nor should I call him even a careless student of the estimates were he to do so, for no charge whatever is stated for their clothes and food; that is embodied in the general estimate, vote 2, viz., "Victuals and Clothing for Seamen and Marines."*

There are, however, members of the House of Com-

* It is an old controversy how the Estimates ought to be made out. My friend, Mr. A. S. Ayrton, who is on a visit to me at present, considers that the present mode is preferable to any other, and having filled the office of Secretary to the Treasury, he ought to know; but, however great my respect for his abilities—and it is so great that I deeply regret his absence from Parliament—I differ from him on this point, and think that the Estimates might be so arranged as to show to the public what the Government require for the different departments under separate heads. For instance, as the wages for the 7,000 boys are given, why should an approximate estimate not be entered of the amount required for their food, clothing, &c., &c. Mr. Ayrton holds that "the Estimates

mons who are not satisfied unless they search to the bottom; and one of the number, Sir George Balfour, moved last year for a return "showing the estimated annual cost in detail of training boys in training-ships for the Royal Navy, with the total average cost of each boy while under training." And what does it show? Why, it shows that instead of £70,268 covering the cost of 7,000 of these boys, the annual cost of training only 3,000 of them amounts to somewhere about £174,400!* But at page 129 of the Estimates, vote 14, "Miscellaneous Services," there is a sum of £2,300 for "expenses specially incurred for the boys" not included in this return, and no doubt there are a great many other items which ought to go to the debit of that account, although I cannot trace them.

Then, again, if we refer to page 20, vote 4, "Royal Naval Reserve, Wages, Allowances, Drill, &c.," we find a charge of £156,200, which the casual reader might consider was the annual cost of this force; and it is only in a note at page 22 that we ascertain the "total charge" to be £240,109.

I wish that some Member of Parliament would move, as in the case of training boys for the Navy, for the full details of this new service, as I feel convinced that this sum, however large, still falls short of representing the whole cost. I direct attention to this fact, for under the same vote, *Reserves*, page 20, A., there is a charge of

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are made out for the purpose of checking the expenditure of money, not for showing the entire cost of branches of service, and that whenever this is required it must be moved for as a return of "cost of service." I think they might be made out so as to do both.

* The "total gross cost per annum of training each boy for the Royal Navy is £57 18s. 1d.," *exclusive* of "any proportion of the original cost of fitting the vessels for training-ships, and exclusive of the expense of raising the boys." See Parliamentary Paper, Navy (training-ships, boys), issued by the Admiralty, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 2nd August, 1875.

£4,117 for "salaries, wages, &c.," Royal Naval Reserve Office, which is not included in the "total charge."

But it is still more difficult to trace the "Contingencies, Coastguard Establishment on Shore," which are put down at only £4,314, and their "fuel and light" at £2,984. But if we turn to page 131, vote 16, of the Estimates, "Pensions and Allowances," we shall find a sum of £55,283 charged for "Pensions to Coastguard," and to page 144 a further sum of £53,056 voted as "Pensions granted to persons formerly employed in the Coastguard Service, &c., &c." Then, if we go back to vote 4, Coastguard Service, we shall find that the "total charge" of that service for the year is no less than £471,906, but which, I presume, is entirely exclusive of pensions.

No doubt much the largest proportion of the expenditure for Coastguard services is for the protection of the Revenue; but it will be under the amount if I deduct from that sum and from the pensions to the men in that service £100,000, and place it to the debit of *Reserves*.

Referring back to vote 16, I find, under the head of "Military and Civil Pensions and Allowances," various very large items, which I have no means of analysing, such as £462,286 for "Pensions and Gratuities to Seamen and Marines."* Altogether, the charge under the head (p. 147) of "Non-effective Service" amounts for the year to £1,896,784, which, I presume, includes half-pay, reserved pay, &c., for officers and men, both of the Navy and Marines and civil employments connected therewith. Out of this sum I may take at least £200,000 for extra pay, pensions, &c., to the continuous service men who constitute a portion of our Reserves. And as we retain about 3,000 men in our harbour ships and elsewhere, for the purpose of *Reserves*, I must debit that head with their

* I presume that very few pensions have yet become payable under the Royal Naval Reserve system, so that in future Estimates there will be increased charges for pensions.

wages, provisions, &c., &c., which at £60 per head, would amount to another £180,000. So that the annual cost for the training of boys for the Navy, and the maintenance of the existing Reserves of seamen, amounts in round numbers to close upon £900,000.

But the expenditure for these purposes does not end here. Besides numerous other charges, which it is impossible for me to trace, much less analyse, we must remember that every boy we train for the Navy, before we make an able seaman of him, costs the country at least £300;* while such boys, if trained in the Merchant Service as sailors, would cost the nation nothing until they joined the Navy. Three thousand of these, known as "second-class boys," are in harbour ships under training. I shall be under the mark if I allow for these and various other payments in connection with "Naval Coast Volunteers," "Short-service Pensioners," &c., &c., £200,000; so that our annual expenditure, under all heads, for boys and Reserves will not fall much short of one million one hundred thousand pounds sterling, to say nothing about the interest of capital in ships employed for training, depreciation, insurance, and so forth, which, strange to state, are never taken into account by any Government in calculating the cost of our ships, or dockyards and other establishments.

Much the most important of the Reserves is the "Royal Naval Reserve," drawn from seamen in the Merchant Service and periodically drilled on shore. I have never had great faith in these short drills on shore or on board

* Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N., who has revised the proof sheets of this chapter, remarks:—"The average age of boys entering the Navy is 16; and before they are rated as ordinary seamen they cost the country £120 each, or £240 before they can be rated as able seamen; but to this sum must be added the waste by death, desertion, &c., which, in four years, amounts to 30 per cent., thus the actual cost of raising the lowest grade of A.B. in the Royal Navy is about £320."

of training-ships, or even in cruising tenders, the cost of which I shall not attempt to estimate; and this want of faith in all such casual and temporary drills applies alike to boys and men. Nor could I see any advantage equivalent to the cost when, a few years ago, a very large number of the men of the Reserve Forces made a longer cruise in our ships of war under the flag of the Lords of the Admiralty. Most of these cruises resolve themselves into pleasure trips, and the drills on shore are, as a rule, pleasant social gatherings rather than trainings where a substantial advantage is obtained equivalent to the cost; and they are not to be compared to the advantages derived from *actual service.*

A boy, for instance, destined for the Merchant Service, does not learn so much during four years on board a training-ship as he would do during one year in a vessel at sea where he was serving his apprenticeship.*

Nor is the training of the boys for the Navy much better. In the vessels specially appropriated in both services for the purpose, they pass through a routine—very good in itself—for the purpose of laying the foundation on which the structure of seamanship is to be reared, but this alone does not make able, or even ordinary seamen of them.†

Thus, while professing to train seamen for the Royal Navy at a very great expense to the nation, we have not at the present moment in that service more than 11,000 *British able seamen;* and in the two services, Royal Navy

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* "A boy is wholly unproductive during the period of education; whereas, the apprentice boy at sea, while receiving a *practical training*, earns enough to feed and clothe himself." See letter from Mr. Nathaniel Dunlop, of the firm of Messrs. James and Alexander Allan, Glasgow, published 19th January, 1876.

† Captain J. C. Wilson, R.N., who was in command of the vessels engaged in training boys for the Navy, remarks (See "Seamen of the Fleet, their Training, &c., &c.," Royal United Service Institution, July 2nd, 1875):—"Though our sea-going ships carry as many boys as they

and Mercantile Marine, excluding foreigners and British negroes (though some of these are first-rate fellows), we have not more than 40,000 thoroughly-trained able *British* seamen. I confine myself exclusively to this class of mariners.

Let us now inquire in earnest, and, I believe, for the first time, what number of such men we really require for the Royal Navy and for the Mercantile Marine—I mean able seamen, who, as in all other branches of industry, have served the necessary apprenticeship to make them efficient in their calling and skilful in all its details, for there is as much detail in the duty of a thorough sailor as there is in that of any mechanic.

Of course opinions as to the requisite number must vary; but after consulting men in both services in every way competent to guide me, and using my own experience and knowledge for what they are worth, I have come to the conclusion that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ought at all times to have 100,000 trained able seamen of its own, including the petty and warrant officers of the Royal Navy; and that the seamen of both services should be induced, as far as practicable, to intermingle and periodically interchange with each other the duties of either service, maintaining a constant flow from boyhood, through manhood, up to that term of life, when no longer fit for service at sea.

We have now to inquire how 100,000 able British seamen are to be obtained, trained, and maintained.

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can stow, there are still from 1,500 to 1,700 constantly on depôt, waiting their turns for draft. Whilst thus waiting, a considerable number of them reach their eighteenth year, and are by order rated men; thus the 1,200 ordinary second-class rated in the Estimates may be taken to represent a body of sailors who have never been at sea at all!" "I know one *able seaman* in the Royal Navy," he added, one day when we were talking over the subject, "who had *never* been at sea, and I dare say there are numerous others."

The very idea of reverting to the old law, in its integrity, when every merchant vessel was required to carry an apprentice for every 100 tons, terrified, as well it might, our large steam shipowners. If such a law was now in force, and the gross tonnage were made the basis for calculation, the Cunard Company, for instance, would be compelled to carry from twenty to forty apprentices in each of its steamers; and Mr. Inman, in his last and biggest boat, would be obliged to have no less than fifty! These and the other great lines of steamers could have no possible use for one-third or one-fourth of that number. I say nothing about being able to train to advantage even half that number of boys in any ship; and consequently the revival of the old law, though based on registered tonnage, would be to shipowners, not merely a monstrous hardship, but an intolerable nuisance. But we are not, however, now required to pass any such law; and if we were, it would be a most ineffective one for the objects in view, as steamships do not, and cannot, train the best class of seamen, and have only the means, in the ordinary course and requirements of their service, to train a very limited number of youths for sailors; and these must ever be inferior to seamen trained in sailing vessels. They might indeed prove valuable in their particular line, and for that purpose would be an acquisition.

I have now to consider if we cannot meet all our requirements by a modified system of apprenticeship, which would really be of great advantage to the nation and to shipowners themselves, without inflicting any hardship upon either the proprietors of steam or sailing vessels. I should, however, leave those of them who do not approve of taking apprentices to adopt a small money payment instead (which would go towards the reduction of the vote for training-ships), as recommended by the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships. Many owners, especially of steam vessels, may prefer to do so, and there are also

owners of sailing vessels engaged in the trade with North America who cannot find employment for apprentices during winter, who would prefer being relieved by some such small payment. Should such be the case, they might thus be exonerated from the necessity of carrying any apprentices.

To perfect the scheme I have in view, I have again sought the aid of Mr. Stoneham, the Registrar-General of Seamen, which he has readily afforded.

Considering the enormous increase in our Mercantile Marine, I find that we can now train all the apprentices necessary to maintain a standing force of 100,000 able seamen without any hardship upon the shipowners as a class. To show how this may be done, Mr. Stoneham has prepared for me the following tables, one of which would require one apprentice to be carried in every vessel of less than 300 tons, and the other only one in every vessel of less than 400 tons—scales *much below*, in either case, what owners of vessels of that tonnage now consider it for their interest to take. These tables, as will be seen, apply to the United Kingdom and her Colonies and Possessions.

Table showing the number of Registered Sailing and Steam vessels, classed according to Tonnage, belonging to the United Kingdom and British Possessions:—

Belonging to	TONNAGE.														
	Under 100.	100 and under 200.	200 and under 300.	300 and under 400.	400 and under 500.	500 and under 600.	600 and under 700.	700 and under 800.	800 and under 1,000.	1,000 and under 1,200.	1,200 and under 1,500.	1,500 and under 2,000.	2,000 and under 2,500.	2,500 and under 3,000.	3,000 and above.	TOTAL.
The United Kingdom	14,496	3,152	1,496	1,019	807	583	529	423	665	583	622	317	73	29	10	24,804
The Isle of Man ... The Channel Islands	469	100	55	13	10	5	4	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	657
British Possessions ...	8,087	1,573	645	375	215	161	151	97	164	102	85	19	1	—	—	11,675
Total	23,052	4,825	2,196	1,407	1,032	749	684	521	829	685	707	336	74	29	10	37,136

From the above it will be found that the number of

apprentices obtained by allotting them in the following proportion, would range from 23,000 to 26,220:—

No.		PROPORTION.				Number of Apprentices obtained.
1.	Apprentices...	1 per Ship. 8,428	2 per Ship. 4,930	3 per Ship. 8,226	4 per Ship. 1,796	23,380
	Tonnage	100 to 400	400 to 700	700 to 1,500	1,500 and above	
	Number of Vessels ...	8,428	2,465	2,742	449	
2.	Apprentices...	1. 7,021	2. 6,376	3. 10,278	4. 1,796	25,471
	Tonnage	100 to 300	300 to 600	600 to 1,500	1,500 and above	
	Number of Vessels ...	7,021	3,188	3,426	449	
3.	Apprentices...	1. 7,021	2. 4,878	3. 12,525	4. 1,796	26,220
	Tonnage	100 to 300	300 to 500	500 to 1,500	1,500 and above	
	Number of Vessels ...	7,021	2,439	4,175	449	

On further consideration, and after consulting Mr. Stoneham and other gentlemen competent to advise me, I thought it better that, for the present, at least, any legislative measure should be confined to the United Kingdom. Canada, for instance, might object to a law requiring her shipowners to carry apprentices, on the very valid ground that she could have no guarantee that she was not providing trained seamen for her immediate neighbour, the United States of America. It would, therefore, be desirable to deal now only with our own wants, and to leave the Legislatures of our colonies to follow our example if considered advantageous. Various other reasons have led me to this conclusion, but these I need not here enter upon; nor need I now argue this question from the other point of view, although I see numerous advantages to be derived by the Colonies from the extension of the scheme.

I have, therefore, had another table compiled showing the number of apprentices that would be produced on the following scale from vessels belonging *exclusively* to the United Kingdom:—

Scale.	No. of Vessels.	No. of Apprentices.
1 Apprentice to each Vessel between 80 and 200 Tons	4463	4463
2 ,, ,, ,, 200 ,, 500 ,,	3322	6644
3 ,, ,, ,, 500 ,, 1500 ,,	3405	10.215
4 ,, ,, Above 1500 ,,	429	1716
Total	11,619	23,038

Many of my readers may be of opinion that if we reorganise the system, the number of apprentices in the above table would be sufficient to maintain 100,000 able seamen; but though the removal of the greatest temptation, the *employment of boys for the voyage*, and the introduction of more simple laws for the discovery and punishment of desertion, with some fresh international consular arrangements, would tend very materially to reduce the amount of desertion, I think that we ought, at all times, to have 30,000 youths serving their apprenticeship between the ages of 16 and 20.*

I have, therefore, with the assistance of the Registrar-General of Seamen, compiled the following table, applicable to the United Kingdom alone, which would give about the required number of apprentices :—

Scale.	No. of Vessels.	No. of Apprentices.
1 Apprentice to each Vessel between 50 and 150 Tons	7258	7258
2 ,, ,, ,, 150 ,, 350 ,,	3362	6724
3 ,, ,, ,, 350 ,, 1200 ,,	4087	12,261
4 ,, ,, Above 1200 ,,	1051	4202
Total	15,758	30,447

* The most important resolutions of a committee of the leading shipowners of Liverpool, who, in 1870, inquired thoroughly into the condition of our merchant seamen, was, "That, in order to obtain efficient supplies

I propose that this scale should form the basis of a new apprenticeship law. It will be seen by the above table that I obtain a very large portion of my supply from those vessels where boys, and especially good apprentices, would, so far from being a hardship, *be a great acquisition to their owners.* For instance, every vessel between 50 and 150 tons requires a boy: and that boy, under the immediate eye of the master, who is very frequently the owner of the vessel, would be so well trained and cared for, that before he had been two years at sea he would, in such craft, be as valuable as a man,* nor would it be any hardship for vessels from 150 to 350 tons to carry two apprentices, much less for those of from 350 to 1,200 tons to carry three, and for all above to take four. As the calculation is based upon the net register tonnage, the owners of steam vessels above 1,200 tons, who have been the chief opponents of any apprenticeship scheme, could hardly find any just ground for complaint. So far from four boys being a hardship in such large vessels, they would prove an advantage, as their captains would obtain youths, from the source to which I shall hereafter refer, who would be of some service to them even on the first day they were embarked, and that is more than they can say of some of the men, who, for want of an organised and well-understood system amongst themselves, are obliged to be shipped at high wages as ordinary seamen—too many

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of good seamen, the Government should provide and support training-ships in sufficient number at all our large seaports, and that Government should encourage as much as possible the apprenticeship system."

* My space does not allow me to enter upon details; but I should have all indentures upon a form prepared and issued by Government, which could be printed and sold at a nominal price. These indentures should be entered into before a magistrate or shipping master, and attested by either, and even if the stamp, which I affix to all indentures, were only a halfpenny, it should be in a conspicuous form, so that the boys and parents alike, might SEE that they were entering upon a solemn engagement which the law would promptly punish if abused.

of whom are not equal to the youths obtained from Industrial Schools after twelve months' training.*

To maintain 30,000 apprentices afloat, we must engage, through various channels, as we now do, about 2,000 youths, and we should further require to prepare and preliminarily train 6,000 more *annually*. As the Navy, from the scheme I have in view, would draw its supplies of seamen from that source, and the nation would likewise make it the basis of its Reserves, the nation should, at its own cost, provide, within certain limits, for the training of these 6,000 boys, more especially as we should, by the conditions of the scheme, require the Mercantile Marine to maintain afloat a certain number of apprentices, who, however valuable for its own purposes, would be subservient to those of the State as trained seamen and reserves—the shipowners providing from their own resources the other 2,000.

If I based my calculations on the number required to supply the wants of the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service *under present circumstanees*, then 8,000 preliminarily trained boys annually embarked in these services would not suffice to maintain 100,000 seamen,† but I base my computation on the *entirely different state of things* I desire to see carried out, being convinced that the present mode of obtaining supplies of seamen, alike in the Navy and Merchant Service, encourages, as I have endeavoured to show in the case of the latter, desertion to a far greater extent than ought to be the case. This, in fact, is one of

* Mr. Brassey, who has a warm feeling towards our seamen, and is not disposed to admit that they are worse than they were, remarks in one of his speeches on the subject of manning, "There is large room for improvement" (in our seamen), "and it will be a reflection on our age of advanced civilization if nothing effectual is accomplished for their amelioration."

† In a letter addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty by a "Retired Captain R.N.," on the 29th February, 1876, it is stated that during "1859-62, 10,000 seamen, marines, and boys deserted from the

the causes of complaint I have against the present haphazard, unsystematic and unsatisfactory state of affairs.

By the tables of mortality, 2,000 boys per annum ought to be more than sufficient to supply the loss by death in 100,000 men between the ages of 16 and 50, and the remaining 6,000 per annum ought to be ample, under a *well-regulated system to cover all other contingencies.*

Looking at this question in all its various ramifications, I think that it would not be unreasonable to require the nation to provide for an annual supply of 6,000 boys, part for its own use at first, and part for the Mercantile Marine,* as the whole of them in the long run would be for the use of the nation. These boys I should train in ships as we now do, or if we had not sufficient old vessels to spare, I should train them in barrack schools, at the mouths of rivers, or by the sea-side, provided with the deck and rigging of a ship, as at Feltham and elsewhere. When I mention barracks, I do not mean those large ungainly structures to be seen in our arsenals; much less the expensive buildings throughout the country appropriated to charitable and similar purposes, where it is difficult to comprehend, until you are close upon them, whether they are palaces or poor-houses; but temporary

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Royal Navy; all, with the exception of the boys (although they had cost a good sum to train), had received bounty or half bounty.

Adding these figures together, we have, for about twelve years—

Desertions	64,000
Bounty paid in two first instances	£1,060,000
Bounty paid in the two last instances ...	144,000
Total	£1,204,000"

* It is only due to Admiral Sulivan to state that he was one of the first, if not the first, to advocate publicly the establishment of training-ships. See his pamphlet, "Remarks on the Merchant Seamen's Fund, and Manning the Navy," published April, 1858, by Spottiswoode, specifying all the details of cost, &c., which experience has since proved to be very accurate.

buildings, such as at Aldershot, where the boys, trained in divisions, could sling their hammocks, and where on the beach they would have boats for rowing, and a wooden jetty with a crane, where they would learn the art of landing and stowing their own stores, a duty alike essential to the seamen of the Royal Navy and Mercantile Marine.

In the training-ships, I should recommend the vessel of the Marine Society to be adopted as the model, as from very long experience I think it is perhaps the best regulated of the whole. In this vessel boys are not kept on board for more than nine months, and their cost averages about £22 per annum. But as a boy from the sources from which we should be obliged to draw him would not be of much value to the Navy, or to our ship-owners, until he was sixteen years of age, I should ask the Government to provide him for double that time, or eighteen months if necessary, so that he would gain strength while learning the preliminary duties of a seaman, and especially that order and discipline which is essential in all vessels.*

The cost therefore, to the country would be £33 for the education, training, and maintenance of each boy for eighteen months, or in round numbers £200,000 per

* Captain Rowland Brookes, the Superintendent of the Feltham Industrial Schools, remarks in a note I have just (18th Nov.) received from him—"I think if lads from training-ships could be bound apprentices at 15 years of age instead of at 16, even if they served 5 years instead of 4, it would be found in the long run to work better, as I think the younger lad would be found more tractable, and that he can be taught his work quicker and better than the older lad. I know from experience with our boys here, that if (after they go to sea as apprentices) we can get the younger ones over their first twelve months, they nearly always *serve their full time*, but in the case of the older ones, whose characters are more forward, it is very seldom we can get them to remain over their first voyage—and this is, I believe, the case with other training-schools, to a greater extent even than with us, as their boys are older than ours."

annum for the whole, which is very little more than the cost, &c., at present, of training 3,000 boys for the use of the Royal Navy alone. I should not disturb the existing ships, nor the mode in which boys are therein trained, and at the age of fifteen or sixteen I should indenture them to merchant ships somewhat after the mode suggested by the Commission on Unseaworthy Ships.* But in consideration of the Government grant I should allow the Admiralty to have its choice of whatever boys they require for their own wants *as boys*, and I should require the young men, to such an extent as the Admiralty might want them, *who have received Government aid*, to serve in the Royal Navy, after they had finished their four years' apprenticeship in the Merchant Service, for such a term of years as may be found necessary to make efficient† Navy seamen. After that they might follow their own choice, either by remaining in the Navy if there were vacancies, or returning to the Merchant Service if they desired.

As the Navy thus obtained its supplies of boys and men, I should by degrees transfer its training-ships to form part of the general probationary school-vessels. These would be stationed in different localities or centres

* The scale of pay for apprentices is a matter for consideration, but as the demand for labour has materially increased in all branches of trade, I think it would be desirable to increase the existing scale—but that would rest with the shipowners themselves and be regulated by the supply and demand—to £7 for the first year, £9 for the second, £12 for the third, and £17 for the last, or £45 for the term of apprenticeship, 10 or 15 per cent. of which might be deferred payment until they had concluded their term of apprenticeship.

† Boys trained until they were 16 years of age at the expense of the country, presuming that 8 years would be amply sufficient for service in the Navy, would be entirely free at the age of 28. Whereas boys now entering the Royal Navy, upon whose education and training there was no national expenditure until they reached the age of sixteen, are now required to sign the following document before they are received, which binds them, if they enter at that age, to serve until they are 28 years of

of recruiting, where their services were most required, materially increasing the number in the north-eastern ports where small vessels are most abundant, placing them under similar control with the existing training-ships, and drawing the captains and officers of all these vessels chiefly from the experienced men in the Navy. Their appointment, however, should be made by the different local committees, who now voluntarily and most economically and efficiently manage these vessels, and who do so without any reward beyond what the pleasure affords—greatly, I must add, to their credit and to the benefit alike of the nation and the Mercantile Marine. At the same time, to secure a well-organised system, it would be desirable that all these training-ships should be visited periodically by a Board of Trade, or some other competent, official inspector, as in the case of schools on shore, so as to insure efficiency and the proper application of the Government grant, which might be made in such a manner as not to interfere in any way with the voluntary aid now so liberally afforded to these training-ships. Indeed, it might be made so as to encourage voluntary subscriptions to boys for efficiency, and of good character.

If the scheme I have sketched out be adopted, it would involve no immediate or radical changes. Extra ships

age, or five years longer than I suggest, preventing them from being voluntary agents during the best years of their manhood. May not this standing regulation account, to a large extent, for the great number of desertions from the Navy? "I hereby certify that my son has my full consent (being himself willing) to enter Her Majesty's Navy for a period of ten years' continuous and general service, from the age of 18, in addition to whatever period may be necessary until he attain that age, agreeably to Her Majesty's Order in Council, dated 1st April, 1853, and the Admiralty Regulations of the 14th June, 1853, relating thereto. And I declare that he has never had fits, and that he has never been an inmate of a reformatory. Witness our hands at , day of , 187 . Date of boy's birth . Parent's signature (or, if dead, nearest relative) . Boy's signature of consent, ; who further declares that he is not indentured as an apprentice."

would be added by degrees to the existing ones, and as the boys were drawn from them into the Navy, the ships now specially employed, for the purpose of training, by the Admiralty would be transferred, as I have just said, to the one general educational seafaring fleet.

Having thus created in time the requisite number of able seamen, we have now to consider how they are to be retained, and that is narrowed to the simple question of supply and demand. We must pay them the market price for their labour; and, as we can afford to do so better than any other nation, it will be our own fault if they enter the service of foreigners.

Somehow or other our shipowners have not, I think, sufficiently considered this question of so-called "high and low wages" in all its bearings. A trained man at £3 or £3 10s., for instance, is cheaper to them than the untrained, and in many cases worthless, man to whom they now pay £2 10s., or perhaps only £2 per month—cheaper not merely on account of the extra work he performs, but because he consumes, or rather wastes, fewer provisions. To analyse this question would occupy too much space, but if I had it at my disposal I could show that the quantity of provisions consumed, and more especially wasted by 12 of these hybrid fellows (to say nothing of the waste and danger by broaching and pilfering cargo), whom shipowners now engage to so large an extent as sailors, would suffice for 15 able seamen who had served their apprenticeship, and had thus been trained, not merely to the art of seamanship, but to habits of economy. It is clearly, therefore, to the advantage of shipowners to have the very best class of educated and trained seamen in their service.

Although sailors are proverbially known as "citizens of the world," and "love to roam," they, after passing the meridian of life, desire to settle down in their Fatherland. It is so with all mankind; the homes of our youth, be

they ever so rugged or humble, present in our declining years, charms not to be found in any other part of the world. This feeling is quite as strong in the sailors of England as in those of any other country.

For these reasons, if we give to our seamen wages and the chance of promotion, or any other advantage equivalent to what they would receive in other countries, they would not leave us. Low wages, stingy fare, bad accommodation, oppressive control, or injustice in any form, would encourage, if it did not compel them, to seek other lands.

So long as we accord to our seamen just laws and sufficient inducements to remain with us, they will not seek employment under foreign flags. But although men who have received maintenance and education at the expense of the State in their youth, when unable to provide for themselves, are bound, in equity, to give in return a limited period of service to the nation, receiving, of course, the current rate of wages; that service may be irksome to many of them, and therefore I should give them an inducement both to enter the Navy, and to enrol as members of her Reserve Force. If sailors entering the Royal Navy do not receive a sufficient sum to procure a suitable outfit for the service, I should grant to all those who are drafted from the Merchant Service, at the age of 20, an allowance for that purpose of a sum not exceeding £10; and to anyone who enrolled for life as a member of the Reserve Force, and who held himself ready to be called out for action within a specified period, I should place to his credit 25s. per annum, which, so long as he adhered to the regulations would give him an annual pension of at least £20 per annum at 50, and £24 per annum at the age of 55. On reaching the age of 50*

* The late Captain Brown, who filled the office of Registrar-General of Seamen in 1859, gave it in evidence before the Commission on Manning the Navy, that 200,000 contributors from the age of 20 of 1s. per month,

the sailor would thus have a considerable "stake in the hedge," which he has not now, and a great inducement to remain under the British flag, and hold himself ready to serve in the hour of need for the defence of his country. Practically the *whole of our able seamen would thus most likely become a Reserve*, and we should thus, at about one-third the cost we are now paying, exclusive of the Coastguard Reserves, retain a body of trained men much more numerous and more effective than we now have, or ever had, on whom we could depend. I should, as a further inducement for them to remain in the country, and without entailing any extra expense, keep open, for the best of the enrolled men, service in the Coastguard, and numerous other employments on shore, for which sailors are well qualified, but which are now frequently bestowed upon landsmen and other less competent persons, through favouritism.*

By this system we should have a constant flow of men entering and passing through the Royal Navy, and by interchanging service in the Mercantile Marine, practically remaining in both the great maritime services of this country—*a matter of the utmost importance to us as a nation*, but one which we have not hitherto attempted to work out in a manner to ensure success.

Press-gangs, trampling under foot the rights and liberties of the people, or even laws *requiring* servitude

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or 12s. per annum, would produce £120,000, which in itself would be sufficient to pension 6,575 men at 1s. per day. He further stated, "Statistical data show that out of 150,000 contributors to the Merchant Seamen's Fund only 6,000 become pensioners at 60 years of age."

* "There are numerous situations under the Crown now filled by a class of men not at all superior to our best seamen in the Navy, and often very inferior, that would, if filled only by picked seamen from the Navy of six years' good service, give us a most valuable Reserve of our best seamen at no cost whatever to the country." Evidence Captain B. J. Sulivan, R.N., before Manning Commission of 1859, Question 2,254, page 135.

under conditions which are irksome, unjust, and oppressive, are not the means of securing an efficient and loyal force in the hour of need; and yet, with the exception of the recent Royal Naval Reserve Force, in itself, as I have endeavoured to show, a force too expensive for its equivalent value, they are the only means we have hitherto adopted to make the vast maritime resources at our command subservient to our purpose in the event of war.

But while the scheme I have endeavoured to shadow forth would give, at all times, a ready command of seamen for the Navy, it would be a great acquisition to the Mercantile Marine, by improving the men in that service in discipline and cleanliness, of which, I must say, a large proportion of them still stand sadly in need.

As the young men who had finished their apprenticeship in the Merchant Service, and had passed through the Royal Navy, would constitute our future Reserves, the existing ones, with the exception of the Coastguard and Royal Marines, should be allowed to die out. We should no longer require any of the seamanship or gunnery establishments in harbour or on shore, except for a short preliminary drill of the young men passing from the Merchant Service into the Navy. Youths between sixteen and twenty years of age, trained in the Merchant Service at sea, and young men between twenty and twenty-three (when the mind is most apt to receive scientific knowledge), trained in the Royal Navy afloat, would have instilled into them a knowledge of the duties of both services, which they would never forget, and which, even in their later years, they would, after they have been a few days on board ship, fall into as naturally as if they had never left a man-of-war. They might, however, be periodically mustered in districts for drill; but otherwise I think that, their simple enrolment, with proof at stated intervals of their fitness and readiness to serve, should be

sufficient to secure the payment of their pension at the age agreed upon. An allowance of five or ten shillings to each, to cover expenses when he was required to put in a personal appearance, might make that appearance more certain, and would not materially increase the expense of keeping our Reserves together, and under our control for the purposes of war.

I think, with the inducements I have named, apart altogether from the clause in their indentures, requiring a certain amount of service in return for what the State had expended on their education, that these young men when they had finished their apprenticeship in the Merchant Service would, instead of avoiding the Navy as they have hitherto done, readily, of their own free will, enter for three years service to the number required, as well as for the Reserve, provided they received during their term of service remuneration, all things considered, equivalent to what they could obtain elsewhere.*

As a very large proportion of the apprentices would be drawn from small vessels, where the owners might prefer boys at fifteen instead of at sixteen years of age, I should allow to all shipowners who engaged boys at that age the sum of £22, for each boy trained, at the expiration of his apprenticeship, provided he was ready to serve for three years on board of a man-of-war, should the

* Captain Wilson suggests that the first three or six months of the period required to serve in the Royal Navy should be devoted to drilling in barracks on shore, so that it might not be necessary when passed into ships of war to give the young men from the Merchant Service that *extra* drill on board ships which is so obnoxious to them. This could be carried out while they were waiting for the vessels on which they were to be embarked, and the change on shore would afford them a relaxation, so that the first or preliminary drill on board, which is so repugnant to spirited young men, as it is a drill to which older and trained men are not subjected, would be an amusement, if not a pleasure, when carried out amongst themselves and apart from the ordinary duties of a ship-of-war.

Admiralty require his services. This allowance would not entail any extra expense on the country, as it would only be equivalent to the cost of his education and maintenance in a training-ship.*

I should further afford facilities for the sons of gentlemen who had passed through the training-ships, or rather colleges, established for the purpose of rendering them competent to become officers in the Mercantile Marine, to pass for a certain term through the ships of the Royal Navy, so that they might learn the art of gunnery, and the drill and discipline necessary for war. They might enter as sub-lieutenants, or in any other somewhat similar capacity; messing with the junior officers in the gunroom. We should thus have in the hour of need an auxiliary force of merchant officers as well as merchant seamen; and by some such arrangement we should remove one of the great and just causes of complaint in the Royal Navy—that we enter so many cadets as to render, under ordinary circumstances, promotion so slow that a man may be far advanced in life before he becomes a lieutenant, and grey-haired when a commander, even if he reach that rank, besides passing a large portion of his time on unproductive half-pay.

Such is the outline of the scheme I venture to submit

* An old friend of mine, a member of the late Government, with whom I have frequently talked over the subject of manning, holds an opinion which has been more than once expressed in public, that instead of keeping up training-ships, and maintaining and educating boys at the public charge, it would be better if the Admiralty agreed to pay a suitable sum to apprentices who, having served their time and attained a prescribed standard of fitness, engaged to enter the Navy for the limited period required for training, and also allowed a suitable sum to the master of the apprentice for bringing him up to the standard, the payment to the seamen themselves, either in money, or deferred annuity, or both, being determined by the nature of the arrangement made for their entering the Reserve after their service in the Navy. But I question if such a scheme could be practically and beneficially carried out except to the limited extent I suggest.

for the consideration of the public, and, I hope, of the Government, so far as regards manning, the cost of which, when in full operation, I may summarise as follows:—

Training 6,000 boys	£200,000
Allowance of £10 to each seaman entering the Navy from Merchant Service, say, 3,000 annually	30,000
Appropriation for pensions to 100,000 enrolled and Reserve men, even if every man entered the Reserve Force	125,000
Allowance to cover cost of enrolled or Reserve men making their appearance at the different record offices	50,000
	£405,000

or little more than one-third the cost of the current expenditure for a similar purpose.

In my introductory chapter I called attention to the number and description of our ships of war, and I ventured to express an opinion that, however formidable we might be in ironclads and huge floating citadels, we had no means of affording sufficient protection to our vast and wide-spread maritime commerce, or to our great commercial depots. I further remarked that the cost of maintaining the system of convoy, adopted by our forefathers, would now be so enormous—even if it were practicable, which I think it would not be—that we should consider some well-devised system whereby our merchant ships would, in a great measure, be able to defend themselves when the necessity arose.

More than twelve months ago I had a conversation on this subject with Mr. James Laing, of Sunderland, a gentleman, of much sound sense and great practical experience as a shipbuilder; the result of that conversation was that steam ships of from 1,200 to 3,000 tons

register tonnage could, at an extra cost of from £700 to £1,200 each in the course of their construction, be built of sufficient strength to carry at the bow and stern 6-ton guns, carrying 120 lb. shot. Captain Wilson, to whom I am indebted for most of my information about modern naval tactics, informs me that shot from such guns could be propelled to a distance of three miles, that they would perform good practice at two miles, that in clear and calm weather they would be safe to hit once in four times at a mile distance, though probably not more than one in ten during the smoke of war, at a distance of 1,000 yards. Nevertheless, these guns would be most effective armaments, and I question if their shot at close quarters, or even moderate range, would not penetrate most of the ironclads of foreign nations.*

Anxious to make myself, as far as I could, master of this subject, I mentioned to Lord Clarence Paget, when he and Mr. E. J. Reed paid me a visit in the course of this autumn, the scheme for manning I had in view, and asked their opinion especially on the point, how merchant ships could be made to protect themselves in the event of war. While giving a general approval to my then crude scheme, Mr. Reed was of opinion that however valuable these heavy long range guns might prove, he thought that a merchant ship fitted to carry four 64-pound guns, which would not exceed the cost of the original construction of the vessel estimated by Mr. Laing, would be even more effective for the purpose of defence.

That question, however, I must leave naval officers, shipbuilders, and gunners to decide. What I now contend for is, that if Government granted the sums I have named to

* All the experiments show that a 6½-ton, or 7-inch gun, with a charge of 30 lbs. and a projectile of 115 lbs., penetrates at 1,200 yards through a 4½-inch plate, with an 18-inch wood backing; that at 600 yards it penetrates through 5-inch iron plates, and 10-inch teak backing; and at 300 yards through 6-inch iron plating, and 20-inch oak or teak backing.

any owner of a steam vessel of a certain size and speed who was disposed to construct his ship, so as to be able to carry either of these armaments when required, and agreed to retain her under the British flag, we could, for a comparatively insignificant sum, produce an auxiliary fleet that would go far towards effectually protecting our commerce, and, in the event of war, would render services of inestimable value to the nation in other respects. I cannot suppose that shipowners would object to this extra weight in the construction of their ships, if they were reimbursed the original cost, as they would be compensated for the extra weight by the extra strength, especially if applied at the fore and after ends, where merchant steamers are generally weaker than they should be in proportion to the strength of the other portions of their hull, and where extra strength is so essential in the case of collision.

I see that this question has been mentioned within the last few months by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and by Mr. Brassey,* Captain Wilson, and others, in the discussions of the United Service Institution and elsewhere; but the subject does not appear to have been followed up to the extent I have in view. Some writers and speakers very

* Mr. Brassey, who recently read an interesting paper on this subject at the United Service Institution, remarks, "There are included in our Merchant Navy eight steam ships of 3,000 tons and more, 24 of 2,500 to 3,000, 55 of 2,000 to 2,500, 165 of 1,500 to 2,000, and 167 of 1,200 to 1,500 tons." We could thus turn out almost instantly in the emergency of war upwards of 400 armed ocean steamers of from 1,200 to 1,000 tons each; and if necessary to extend our auxiliary force we could turn out somewhere about 12,000 steamers of between 50 and 200 tons, which, if furnished with guns or used to carry torpedoes, would in themselves present such a guard to our shores and harbours that the nations of Europe combined, would think twice before they attempted to blockade our ports, much less invade us. The Whitehead torpedo is a weapon especially well adapted for the protection of merchant ships, and if carried by such vessels during war, that force would become most valuable for offence as well as defence.

properly object to these schemes on the ground of the encumbrance to merchant steamers carrying in peace huge implements of war, and therein I entirely agree with them. But all I suggest is that our largest and swiftest steamers could be advantageously constructed to carry them when required, and that would only be in the event of war, where it would be necessary to protect our sea-ports, and especially our commerce afloat; and thus the nation would derive, to the full extent, the advantages of the combined schemes I have ventured to suggest. When that contingency arose, I should supply steam-vessels thus constructed, with the necessary guns and ammunition from our arsenals at home and abroad. If they were in our home ports they could, almost immediately, on the declaration of war, be equipped, and if abroad at the time, they could receive their armaments from our nearest naval stations, in the Mediterranean, Canada, India, Australia, China, and the Pacific.

Portions of their crews, if not the whole, having passed through the training I have suggested, would understand how to work these guns, and thus we could, almost instantly produce, in all parts of the world, an auxiliary force for the purposes of defence, which no other nation could do, unless it possessed similar facilities, and had a Merchant Service of equal dimensions. We should then present a front, which would in reality, bid defiance to "the world in arms" against us.

Of course, to carry out these arrangements, innumerable details would require to be considered; but, so far as I can ascertain, they are of a nature which could be easily overcome by the executive officers of the Admiralty, practically familiar with the subject.

As objections might be raised to bringing into our training-ships, the lowest order of boys, a few of whom came from reformatories and had been convicted of crime, however trivial, I may remark that they are

now separated by the existing system, which I desire to see continued and extended; but if a boy bore a good character while he was in the training-ships, I should not send him forth with a brand on his forehead, which his subsequent good conduct had obliterated. We do not ask, in our dealings with mankind, the origin of those persons with whom we have transactions; so long as we find that they have borne, for years, an unimpeachable character, and are honourable in their dealings, we care not whether they are the sons of peers, peasants, or even convicts. If a boy, at the age of sixteen, were still bad, I should inform the shipowner about to employ him of his true character, or I should endeavour to dispose of him in some other way.

I have now said all I have, for the present, to suggest on the question of manning; but as a great political question, to which I have already incidentally referred, is to be again raised in Parliament—I refer to the effect which the Declaration of Paris, of 1856, must produce, in the event of war, upon our maritime power and commerce—I shall, in the ensuing chapter, endeavour to deal with that subject.

BELLIGERENT RIGHTS.

THE DECLARATION OF PARIS.

CHAPTER VI.

THE "Maritime Rights of Nations," which were very materially modified by the Paris Declaration of 1856,* are of ancient date. For nearly six centuries belligerents were allowed the right of capturing enemies' goods or vessels wherever found on the high seas, and as a consequence they possessed the power of searching for enemies' goods on board neutral ships.

But the exercise of that power, or "*right* of search," as it has from long usage been questionably styled, did not remain undisputed until 1856, as stated by some writers, who base their arguments on that erroneous assumption. The principle that "free ships make free goods" was stoutly contended for by the Dutch in the early part of the seventeenth century, whose country was then the great bonding warehouse of Europe, and who, when holding the position we now do, as the largest

* The Declaration was as follows :—

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.

2. The neutral flag covers enemies' goods with the exception of contraband of war.

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemies' flag.

4. Blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force, sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

To this very important Declaration, all nations may be said to have become parties, with the exception of the United States of America.

carriers by sea, entered, in 1650, into a Treaty with Spain containing that condition. Indeed, Great Britain, who fought so bravely and vigorously against "the world in arms" to maintain the right of search, herself, conceded by Treaty the principle of free ships making free goods, to Portugal in 1654, and to Holland in 1667, and it was likewise introduced into the celebrated Treaties of Utrecht in 1780, as well as into Pitt's Commercial Treaty with France.

It is true, the principle that free ships make free goods, never became the *Law of Nations*, until the Paris Declaration made it so.

But what is International Law?

I ask this question broadly, because a few writers of the present day, argue that the Parliament of the United Kingdom can deal with it as with its own laws. They forget that as International Law has none of the Statutes or precedents which constitute the laws of individual States, it cannot, if for no other reason, be dealt with by the Legislature of *any one* country. But there are other reasons.

International Law appears to me to be simply an agreement, or rather understanding, between nations to secure justice and right for each, or for the subjects of each, and for the benefit and peace of mankind.

Nevertheless, it is of a character which, happily, cannot be broken with impunity, for, it is the grandest and most righteous of all laws. Nor, can it be infringed by any one nation without the sanction of the other nations who have accepted it, or without subjecting that nation to the probabilities of war with all the nations which subscribed the agreement, any more than a law of Great Britain can be repealed without the consent of the Queen, Lords, and Commons.

Some writers are amazed that an agreement of such vast importance as the Declaration of 1856 should have

been entered into by Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament, and I am far from saying that the opinion of Parliament should not have been taken; but the Parliament of the period, must have considered it a necessity or an advantage to ourselves, for had it not been so considered, it must be assumed that, under such circumstances, the Opposition would have marked their dissent by a vote of censure against the Ministry of the day.

There is no assembly in the world more alive to the interests of the country than the House of Commons of the United Kingdom. Men, who speak before they think, may talk about the sacrifice, by certain statesmen, of the best interests of their country, but it is idle talk. However much the different sections may disagree, or however long the struggle, whenever it is apparent that a change has become imperatively necessary for the progress of the nation and the welfare and happiness of the people, all parties, either actively or passively, adopt it. In doing so, they set at naught "the wisdom of their ancestors," ignore the practices of ancient times; and, in recent years, have wisely swept away many traditional superstitions, as regards the modes of conducting both war and commerce:—and, we have prospered in disregard of all the rules formerly laid down to ensure our prosperity.

Grotius, Vattel, and other publicists, were no doubt good authorities in their day and generation, but things have very materially changed since then, and, fortunately, the statesmen and diplomatists, assembled in Paris in 1856, saw this, and resolutely set aside altogether the pedantic maxims, and the precedents of Maritime International Law, which had perplexed the world for centuries. They based their opinions on the circumstances of the times in which they lived; they recollected the old league of the neutral powers in 1780; and, above all, they remembered the Berlin and Milan Decrees of Napoleon in 1806, and our own Orders in Council in 1807, which

paralysed, and almost destroyed the commerce of Great Britain.

Although this country made, during the latter part of the last, and the early portion of this century, vast sacrifices of life and treasure to vindicate its right of search, we soon, afterwards, discovered that that right could be no longer maintained. Since then the intercourse, by sea, between nations has increased to an enormous extent, while the mode of conducting maritime commerce, has undergone a complete revolution; and is carried on with a rapidity of which our forefathers could form no conception. Indeed, the repeal of our own navigation laws, and the changes since 1850 in the navigation laws of other nations, would alone, render the exercise of the right of search altogether impracticable. Great changes have also since then taken place in the relation of the ships of one nation and, the goods of the subjects of another. Formerly, the cargoes were to a much greater extent the property of the subjects of the country under whose flag the ship sailed than they are at present. Now, vessels are laden indiscriminately by the subjects of all nations, so that the difficulty of ascertaining if enemies' goods are on board of neutral ships has, by the changes in the law, as well as by the modes of conducting commerce, greatly increased. In a word, to enforce the right of search against neutrals, would be as intolerable, as it would be found to be impracticable.

Other nations have also become comparatively much more powerful, at sea, than they were three-quarters of a century ago; but, beyond all, a scattered people, on the other side of the Atlantic, have sprung into a great nation. More than half a century ago it had, while in its infancy, bade defiance to our right of search, and would now indignantly, and, without doubt, successfully resist any attempt to enforce it.

But even if any such "rights" had remained undisputed from the date of the Black Book of the Admiralty, or of the Consolato del Mare until 1856, that in itself, would form no reason for their maintenance. If it did, we might, on similar grounds, repudiate all improvement upon the barbarous practices of ancient warfare, and, indeed, ignore every step that has been taken in the advancement of science and commerce.

Although we are still the most powerful nation at sea, that is no valid reason why we should still attempt to maintain these ancient rights. Every person who has read history, and given only a passing thought to events in connection with this subject, must see that we could not, even if we would, resort, in the event of war, to our former practice. It is vain, it is worse than idle to quote in favour of this course, the opinions of statesmen and warriors, however great, of by-gone ages. We must take things as they now are, and deal with them accordingly.

But while we became parties to the Declaration of Paris through necessity, we did so likewise, in our own interests. Unless we are interfered with, when war is being waged between foreign nations, it must be clearly to our advantage to maintain a strict neutrality; and, having by far the largest commerce afloat,* we, as neutrals, are more interested than any other nation in having our merchant ships, and the goods they carry, protected by our flag. But, as belligerents, we are still more interested, for had the right of search, and privateering not been abolished by the Declaration of Paris, the whole of our vast maritime

* Some of my readers may not be aware that the merchant ships of the British Empire, amounted, at the close of 1855, to 7,744,237 tons, about as many as the sea-going merchant ships of all the rest of the world, and that the produce, manufactures, and specie they carry, exceed in value those of all other nations combined. I cannot suppose that the advocates of any retrograde movement have considered these astounding facts.

commerce would be at the mercy of the cruisers of any State, however insignificant, with which we might be involved in war, and be entirely ruined by the equipment under that flag of half a dozen swift steamers, such as the *Alabama*. Nay more, dependent as we are, not merely for the luxuries, but for the necessaries of life, upon foreign countries, we might be starved unless supplies were brought to us by neutral vessels.

For these reasons all first-class maritime nations, with the exception of the United States, to which I shall hereafter refer, have wisely adopted, in their own interests, the policy of neutrality, and, as a consequence, the principle that free ships make free goods, as well as the abolition of the right of search, except for contraband of war; and they have also relinquished the practice of privateering. Nor have we suffered by the limitation of the rights of blockade to those ports and coasts alone, where it is sufficiently enforced to prevent free access to them. Indeed, it is a question well worthy of consideration, whether it would not be to the interests of this country if the blockades of commercial ports were, under certain conditions, abolished. Steam has already driven through them. Railways have opened by land a ready escape from their effects, and swift steamers have rendered it very difficult, if not impossible, for nations to conform to the more stringent conditions of the Declaration of 1856, requiring blockades to be effective.

In our own experience, we have had the most ample evidence to prove, that the power of exercising the right of blockade was of no service whatever to us, as a nation. By maintaining a fleet *at an enormous cost* to blockade the Baltic ports—it did nothing more—we did not injure the trade of Russia, any more than it would have been injured by war without the exercise of that right, while our merchants paid double price for every article they required from that country, by Russian shippers being thereby

obliged to send it to us through Germany, Holland, or France.* Such are the absurdities of attempting to maintain ancient rights, when opposed to modern science, and the progress of nations.

It was estimated that the extra cost paid on Russian produce belonging to *British merchants* for its transport to Memel, was no less than £2,500,000, exclusive of the cost of transport to other ports, which our blockade enforced.

Blockade is solely a belligerent right directed against the trade of the enemy with neutrals. As we gained nothing, but on the contrary, were heavy sufferers by its exercise when we were at war with Russia, we must be still heavier sufferers by its exercise by other nations when we are neutrals; for, as we are by far the largest carriers by sea, any measures which stop or diminish our intercourse with other countries, must inflict more injury on us than on any other nation.

If, again, it be to our interest, as it most assuredly is in nearly every case, to maintain a strict neutrality, and

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* See "The Baltic; its Gates, Shores, and Cities." By the Rev. Thomas Milner, 1855, wherein the author remarks:—"From St. Petersburg and Riga to Memel and Konigsberg, a caravan system has been organised, and is carried on with considerable regularity. Goods for Russia, as cotton, sugar, wines, spices, and other colonial produce, are landed at the Prussian ports, and forwarded to their destination; the same wagons returning with Russian produce, as hemp, flax, tallow, bristles, linseed, and grain, for export to Great Britain, France, Holland, or Belgium. Thus the Russian merchants gain by the commission on this traffic; and the Government profits by the increase of the Customs' duties. One of the Custom Houses on the frontier has taken as much as 1000 thalers a day for import duties; and as many as 500 cartloads of hemp and flax have frequently arrived per day at Memel. Throughout the summer, the town has presented an extraordinary spectacle. Every warehouse, coach-house, stable, and outhouse has been literally crammed with merchandise; the streets and open spaces have been piled with it; while upwards of 100 ships have been kept lying in the harbour, unable to discharge their cargoes on account of all the landing places being occupied."

not interfere with the quarrels of our neighbours, we should do what we can to have blockades under certain reservations abolished, because there is nothing more likely, short of encroaching upon our territories, to induce us to deviate from that sound principle, than their maintenance. By stopping the intercourse of neutrals, their neutrality may become so irksome, or so injurious to themselves, as to oblige them to become belligerents; and when they do, they are not likely to be on the side of the nation which puts the blockade in force.

Everybody must know that, the loss this country sustained, by the blockade of the ports of the Southern States of America, during the recent lamentable civil war, in that country, and that, the sufferings endured by large masses of our people, by being deprived of their usual supply of cotton, were such, that a large section of our own community advocated (and, I must add, from my own knowledge, that the then ruler of France seriously contemplated) the non-recognition of that blockade. I offer no opinion of the justice, or, under the circumstances, the necessity of such a course; but its adoption must have led, either to an enforced abrogation of the acknowledged rights of the United States, or to a war with that country.

I must say, however, that I never could understand why, because two nations, or as in the case of the United States, two sections of a nation choose to quarrel with each other, all the rest of the world should as neutrals, be made to suffer by their quarrel. Much less have I been able to understand, especially if the dispute be one in which we have no interest, why we, as we too frequently have been, should become involved as belligerents. We do not interfere as individuals in private life when our neighbours quarrel—on the contrary, it is proverbial that we aim to keep aloof. Why then should we interfere as a nation with the affairs of other nations, in which we have not any, or at most a very questionable, interest?

Indeed, there is frequently much less show of reason for interfering in the quarrels of foreign nations than there would be in private life for taking part in the feuds of our next door neighbour, as these very often cause us a good deal of annoyance.

I desire to see war confined to the parties directly interested; and that if ever we are again involved in war, it shall be for DEFENCE, and *not* for the purpose of interference, much less aggression. I may be told that "the balance of power"—I never could understand what that really meant—must be maintained, and that consequently the principles I now venture to express are inadmissible as well as Utopian; that they are unsuited to the age in which we live, and that, in fact, they are but the dreams of Quakers and such like men. If, however, they be sound, and the principle of "non-intervention," now professedly adopted alike by Whig and Tory, proves that they are so, why should we not attempt to extend such principles by sweeping away all laws, treaties, and practices likely to encourage war?

If wars in future are to be confined to *defence*, it is no longer necessary, nor is it for our interest, to maintain such of the ancient belligerent rights as would be of no value whatever to us for the purposes of war. Instead, therefore, of attempting to restore any portion of them abrogated by the Paris Declaration of 1856, we should rather, in our own interests, do everything in our power to sweep away the remnant of them that still exists.

The United States of America, having long established as the first principle of their foreign policy, abstaining from interference in the disputes of Europe, suggested, when the Declaration of 1856 was submitted for their approval and acceptance, that "*All private property and private vessels should be exempt from capture,*" and consequently, although heartily approving of the other conditions of the Declaration, they declined to agree to

the first proposition that "Privateering is and remains abolished," unless the other nations adopted the larger principle in advance which they had laid down for their line of conduct.

It is not reasonable to expect them to become parties to the Declaration as it stands. Instead of maintaining large standing navies, their policy is to depend on the patriotism of their people, and when the emergency of war arrives, to grant to them letters of marque, to go forth and do just what our vessels of war are commissioned to do, "burn, capture, sink, or destroy" the ships and other property of their enemies. And, who can deny that, while their principles and practice are wiser and more economical than our own, they are not quite as civilized?

Coupled with that condition, on which I think the United States very properly insisted, the whole question assumed a new shape; and, at the time, I moved the House of Commons for the production of certain papers necessary to show the reasons for the United States declining to become parties to the Paris Declaration as it then stood, and still stands.

In the brief discussion which ensued, Lord Palmerston, then at the head of the Government, explained generally the nature of the correspondence referred to, but which, he said, from its special character, could not be laid upon the table. In the course of these remarks his lordship, replying to the proposal which had been made by the Government of the United States, frankly and unhesitatingly admitted that, "the matter was one which everybody would see was a subject, which required the gravest and most deliberate consideration on the part of the British Government; as, whatever might be the opinion at the first blush, one way or the other, no one could fail to perceive, on reflection, that the question was one deeply affecting all the great interests of this country—commercial, political, and naval, and it was clear that no

answer could be given to such a communication without long and mature consideration."

Although the correspondence was not produced at the time, nor, as far as I am aware, has since been published by Parliament, my readers will find in the message of President Pearce to Congress, 1854-55, when discussing the suggestion made to Prussia, to connect the abolition of privateering with the question of neutral rights, which it was proposed to regulate by convention, the following paragraph: It, no doubt, embodies the views then entertained by the Government of the United States:—

"The proposal to surrender the rights to employ privateers is professedly founded on the principle that private property of unoffending non-combatants, though enemies, should be exempt from the ravages of war. But the proposed surrender *goes little way in carrying out that principle, which equally requires that such private property should not be seized nor molested by national ships of war.* Should the leading powers of Europe concur in proposing as a rule of international law, to exempt private property upon the ocean from seizure by public armed cruisers, as well as by privateers, the United States will readily meet them upon that broad ground."

Having given up, by the Declaration of Paris, the more important of our long cherished "rights," I have ever been at a loss to understand why we, before all other nations, did not at once accept the proposal of the Government of the United States. I should have held up both hands for it, and although I have considered this question now for more than twenty years, and studied it in all its bearings, I have never been able to ascertain why we did not in 1856, in our own interests, take the one step further in advance proposed by the United States.

On this subject I have a nnmber of most interesting letters now before me from Mr. Richard Cobden, but, though addressed to myself, I will not publish more than

extracts from them, as I hope his executors may soon place the letters themselves in abler hands, with the materials for the publication of his life and correspondence. At the present moment their publication would be invaluable, more especially as I learn that the policy of this nation, in adopting the Declaration of 1856, is to be brought forward next session in Parliament, by a member of the House of Commons, who, with others, have formed themselves into a "league," having for its object the "abrogation" of this now celebrated Declaration. Vain and futile will be their efforts. They might as well attempt to carry the restoration of the Corn and Navigation Laws, or the Heptarchy itself, and with it all the usages of war which then prevailed; and, in the hope that they may be induced to revise their resolution and support an *onward* course, I shall venture to give them a few extracts from the letters of my departed friend, whose sagacity they must admit, and whose disinterested honesty of purpose, they cannot fail to respect.

Writing to me on the 28th day of May, 1856, immediately after the Declaration, about "the danger of our ships of war being mixed up with the squabbles of the Costa Ricans and the Nicaraguans, until some morning we shall hear that *Englishmen* and *Americans* have been firing on each other,"—he goes on to say, "Have you ever thought of the effects that would be produced on English shipping property in case of a war with America, or any other maritime power, owing to the new principle now being formally admitted by us that free ships make free goods? *All our carrying trade would, of course, be in the hands of neutrals.* Who would carry goods in an English bottom and pay 20 per cent. against capture when ships under other flags would sail without any such burden? The Americans, who have brought us to this, are now, I believe, willing (Bright told me they had proposed it) to make private property exempt from plunder

at sea altogether. This is what we must come to, and the sooner the better. I told a learned German as much in a letter last year, and he has, it appears from the enclosed I received a couple of days since, followed up the idea in a pamphlet, which I have no doubt is valuable as an argument, and for the learning it brings to bear. But I have not yet received a copy. I suppose it is lying at my lodgings. But you will see Dr. Asher says copies can be had at a bookseller's. If it were worth publishing here, suppose you were to have a translation printed with a preface of your own, advocating the principle?"

My time was, however, so fully occupied with business that I had then none to spare for writing prefaces or pamphlets, or for studying this important question, and when I subsequently, by his wish, and I must add reluctantly, brought it under the notice of the House of Commons, I felt that I was then very far from being master of the subject. I therefore urged upon him to do so himself, to which he replied, 24th August, 1856:—"I wish you to inform yourself exactly on what is going on upon the question referred to in the enclosed, and to take a part becoming a man who entered public life with the avowed wish to represent the fair and honest, but not *exclusive* interests of the shipowners. I remember two years since making a few remarks in the House on this subject, with which you expressed a hearty concurrence, and that led me to occupy my mind more closely upon the subject, and always with a growing conviction of the unsoundness of the distinction which has been observed in the treatment of private property ashore and afloat, to the disadvantage of the latter. Why should a man's property be given up to pillage at sea when it would be held inviolate on land.* Is it not enough that it is always

* As I am anxious to avoid pushing my own arguments in favour of the course I advocate, beyond their legitimate conclusions, I may remark that if my departed friend, in this letter, refers to *individual* pillage, into

exposed to the extra risks of the winds and the waves? When Wellington, after driving the French out of Spain, pursued them into France in 1814, he hung up without mercy any of his soldiers who were found committing robberies upon the farmers or shopkeepers of the country through which he marched. But if the property of these farmers or shopkeepers had been floating a mile at sea the British admiral would have sent his sailors to carry it off, and would himself have shared the prize. Is there any justice, logic, or reason in the distinction?"

On the 29th of the same month, he again wrote to me, "I will not throw another feather's weight upon your back at present, for you seem to have already overloaded yourself. But I hope, before Parliament meets, you will be able to look into this very important question of Maritime International Law laid down by the American Government for the consideration of the nations of Europe. . . . I tell you candidly I want to see war brought as much as possible to a duel between Governments and their professional fighters, with as little stimulus from the hope of plunder and prize-money as possible, and the proposal from the American Government carries out my wishes completely. I think you would have more

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which his words might be construed, he states his case in stronger language than the facts admit. The commander of a force on land makes his requisition on the enemy, but, although by the usages of modern warfare, individual soldiers can no more pillage than individual sailors, the commader of a ship of war fires upon, seizes, takes away or destroys a ship solely engaged in peaceful commerce. Therefore, the hope of prizes for the benefit of the individual captors is a strong argument in favour of the opinion that it encourages war, although it is not an argument against capture for the benefit of the belligerent nation against the other, and so making that other feel the stress of war. The first Napoleon invariably and rigorously adopted this practice, and the Germans, following his example, pursued it with most marked and oppressive effect in their late war against France.

weight on such a question than any of us, because your maritime experience would not only give you a legitimate right to be heard (a great point in the House where there is a jealousy of mere professional talkers), and also arm you with technical knowledge not accessible to the majority, who would therefore, listen, as they always do, attentively to one who they believe is capable of giving them information. But, above all, the case is irresistibly strong in reason and morality."

But my departed friend had more faith in my power than I had myself. I did raise the subject, as I have stated, but I did not do it justice from not having then sufficiently studied it, and from a feeling which always impressed me when I spoke in the House of Commons on topics of that kind, that I was addressing an assembly far beyond me in learning, and that to attempt to instruct the greatest lawyers in the kingdom on a question of international law was so presumptuous that I never spoke there with the same freedom that I would have used to my equals on a public platform. If Mr. Cobden had taken up this subject himself I believe it would have been settled years ago. But I am not without hope that his great colleague, who is still with us, may do so next session in Parliament. It is an all-important one for this country.

Passing over numerous other letters, in which Mr. Cobden refers to the Declaration, he remarks in one I had from him, on the 16th January, 1857 :—" What you say about our Government having been the *sole* exception to the Governments of Europe who have given their adhesion to Marcy's (the United States) offer, corresponds with what I hear from other quarters. The case is clear . . . . and in the hands of a practical man is quite unanswerable. . . . . I am sorry that our delay in accepting the American offer gives the Senate a loophole for withdrawing Marcy's offer. There is all the more necessity for promptitude when Parliament meets."

On the 5th February, 1857, he again writes; "... It seems to me that the very fact of Palmerston not having noticed the United States proposal is a sufficient reason why it ought to be brought under the notice of the House. . . . ."

But a letter I received from him, on the 14th May following, bears so closely upon the question about to be raised next session, that I give it at length:—

"I could make out a better case in the interests of Britain, against blockades in case of war, than even against high sea privateering. But *that* is not the question. What we have to do is to ask for information respecting the actual state of negociations affecting our maritime rights in case of war." (More than twenty years have since elapsed, and we have not, so far as I am aware, yet had it.) "Surely this is a practical question. The first point is, does the House and the country accept the agreement come to at Paris? Admitting that it was a stretch of constitutional privilege to sign away belligerent rights, which were sanctioned by our law courts without consulting Parliament; *but accepting it, as you and all rational men must, as an irrevocable act, there arises the question whether having gone so far—it all turns on that*—it be not our interest to accept the further proposal of the United States. If since that offer was made by the United States Senate, the new President has changed the offer, as is rumoured, into one for abolishing blockades, *that* shows the evil of delay in considering the first proposal. But it also ought to be an argument with the House for requiring full information now from the Ministry upon a question so deeply affecting the interests of the country. Your remarks would point to the necessity of inquiry and enlightenment, rather than to any decision of the House in the form of a formal vote. It is *your* question."

Again, on the 29th June, 1857, Mr. Cobden writes: "I

enclose an extract from President Pearce's message last year, stating what reception his proposal had met with from other Powers. Marcy's despatch was published last summer, but I have not the exact date. Your neighbour, Mr. Dallas, would instantly lend you a 'Congressional' copy of both the message and dispatch, in an authentic and readable form, if you will drop him a line to that effect. I think it most probable that *at the time* when Mr. Marcy made his proposal it would have been approved of by the United States Congress. Whether under Buchanan's reign it would be endorsed either by President or people is another question, for each new administration likes to signalise its rule by a policy of its own, and probably General Cass may now go a step further than Mr. Marcy, and require that all blockades shall be abolished. But this only goes to prove the evil of delay on our part. *As a rule*, whatever foreign engagements are entered into by the American Executive, are endorsed by the *Senate*, who have a veto power in such matters—the exceptions are when a new President is elected before the measure is ratified."

On the 4th July, 1857, Mr Cobden further writes: ". . . . You will remember what twaddle was uttered by Lord John, and by . . . . (your own *protege*) in the late Parliament upon this subject. The latter ignored all that was done at Paris, and seemed to argue as if it was impossible that we should give up the rights we exercised in the War of 1793-1815. Lord John, on the other hand, could not exactly say that; he had evidently a very imperfect notion of what had been done, and had never faced the consequences. Now, the House is profoundly ignorant upon this important matter. You have the rare opportunity of giving them information for which they are always attentive and grateful; but I fear you are too much engaged or too diffident to do it. What you have to do, if you will only do it, is to point

out what was the practice in former wars, *and how much we have given up at the Paris conferences*, and then, consider whether having gone so far, it be not for our interest to go forward in the path indicated by Mr. Marcy. But at all events it would be mere childishness to go on talking, as Urquahart and others do, about the unconstitutional and illegal way in which Lord Clarendon surrendered our maritime rights at Paris. If the House of Commons intends to repudiate concession, LET IT SAY SO, or if not, let it affirm it, and then proceed like statesmen and men of business TO CONSIDER WHAT, UNDER THE ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES, IS BEST FURTHER TO BE DONE."

This, indeed, seems to me to be the only question Parliament has now to consider. I have already endeavoured to show that we cannot adopt any retrograde measures, and that if we could it would not be for our interest to do so. Let us now consider what our position will be in the event of war should we remain as we are. If unhappily involved in war with the United States of America, that nation, having declined to become a party to the Paris Declaration as it now stands, would exercise the ancient right of sending forth privateers to prey upon our commerce. Half-a-dozen of these would be sufficient to sweep the merchant flag of England from the seas. It is idle to talk of protecting it as we have hitherto done by convoy, even if the plan I have proposed for self-defence were adopted—(See Chapter V.) The mere fact that our ships and all goods conveyed by them would be subjected to a war premium, would be sufficient in itself to transfer the carrying trade to vessels of neutral nations. The twenty per cent. named by Mr. Cobden would not be necessary to deprive England of her carrying trade. One, or even one-half per cent. under existing circumstances, would be amply sufficient. On this point he remarks, in a letter from Paris, dated 9th August, 1860 (what he states is, I fear, as true now as it was then):—"Do you

think," he inquires, "there are half-a-dozen of people in England who have realised what the effects of the new law respecting the rights of neutrals will be upon our shipping in the case of a war with a maritime power? Do you think that Lord John or Lord Palmerston, when they opposed the plan for carrying out to the full extent the new principle, can be counted among the six? It is quite clear to me that we must yield even the last stipulation of the Americans by renouncing blockades. Indeed, blockades have lost their importance since railways have become general. The terrible fact is this, that so long as the French could, in case of our being at war with that country, keep a few fast steamers at sea, the premium for insurance against capture would exclude our ships from being employed in our own carrying trade and throw the business into the hands of foreigners."

"Naval men will be averse to this change because it will deprive them of prize money. *Governments* also instinctively oppose it—for what excuse would they have for maintaining a costly Navy if it were agreed that private property at sea should be free from molestation, and therefore require no protection? But this is an additional reason why the public should be fully informed on the subject."

Writing about the agitation, which at the time prevailed, of a war with France, by many persons then thought probable on account of the reputed vast increase in her naval armaments, Mr. Cobden on the 8th August, 1860, inquiringly asks: "Has the evidence on your shipping committee been published? Was your report adopted? The state of public feeling in England, *Germany*, and Switzerland, towards France makes me uneasy for the future. France will not begin a war with England, but in their present state of preparation for fighting, the two countries may easily find themselves some day in such a predicament that war or humiliation may be the

only alternative." . . . . "When our statesmen talk of our 'Naval Supremacy,' and name the immense fleets which we possess to assist it, their minds are filled with the traditions of 1810, and they indulge in the dream that our superiority at sea would secure all the advantages to our commerce which it conferred on it fifty years ago. They do not realise the revolution which has been effected by the United States by their assertion of the full rights of neutrals. If we were now at war with France, our fleets would protect our own ports against blockade, merely to allow American and other foreign shipping to do *our* carrying trade! In the last great war, on the contrary, our cruisers prevented the ships of the United States and other foreign countries from performing *their carrying trade*. There is great danger attending our ignorance upon this question, for the country talks of a war with France without knowing what it means. I suspect the French Government have a better notion than ours of the altered state of things. . . . ."

Having given these extracts from the letters of one of the greatest statesmen of our age, whose name will long be held in affectionate remembrance by myriads of people, I invite my readers to consider with me, what would now be the effect upon us, of a war with France or with any of the other great Continental Powers? In doing so, I am exceedingly glad to find that "more attention is at last about to be paid to the subject," and that notwithstanding "two attempts last session to introduce it into Parliament" failed, "the promise (to which I have incidentally referred) is made of a motion this year to *abrogate* the Declaration of Paris."*

Although, as I have already stated, we might as well

* See pamphlet, "England's Maritime Rights," by John Ross, of Bladensburgh, Coldstream Guards. Published by Hardwicke and Bogue, London, 1876. See also Proceedings Royal United Service Institution.

attempt to restore the Heptarchy as "abrogate" the Declaration of 1856, there are questions in connection with it which still require the gravest consideration, and, therefore, I especially invite Mr. Ross, and those persons who entertain his opinions, to consider with me, in all its bearings, the question I have raised. I desire to do so in the most friendly spirit, as I conscientiously believe that we have at heart the maintenance of the Maritime Power, and greatness of this country, and that in our discussions we shall alike have in view, free from party opinions, the prosperity and happiness of its people.

I presume Mr. Ross will admit one *great* fact—which I have already asserted—that we have, at all times, more merchant vessels afloat than any other nation, and that as we have more at stake than nearly all other nations combined, it must consequently be much more to our interest than to that of any other country, that private property should be free from capture at sea in the event of a war where we are belligerents. I think also he can hardly fail to admit, that it would be equally our interest, though to a less extent, that the vast amount of property which we have always afloat, should, if we cannot protect it in our own vessels, be protected under a neutral flag. It is true, that in such a war as I have supposed, a European war, a considerable portion of the carrying trade would, under any circumstances, pass into the hands of foreigners, even if all the nations who were parties to the Declaration of 1856 rigidly adhered to its conditions. I say so because underwriters, naturally entertaining the fear that some one of these nations might not do so, would demand a war premium on our ships, which, however small, would be sufficient to send the trade to neutrals. Competition is now so great, that it does not require even one per cent. on most articles to effect the transfer; one-quarter, or even one-eighth, might, in the case of valuable goods, be sufficient. Only the other day,

when there was a rumour of war about the Turkish question—unhappily not yet settled—the underwriters talked about a war premium on our ships, and every merchant and shipowner knows that such an announcement means that the current rate of insurance is to be higher upon our ships than upon those of other nations. It might apply, in a greater or less degree to most other European nations in the event of a war in Europe, but it would *not* apply to the ships of the United States, not merely because that country was not likely to be involved in the war, but because she was no party to the Paris Declaration. Consequently her vessels would have a preference as carriers in every branch of over-sea commerce, and in all parts of the world.

Hitherto I have confined my arguments to the effect of the Declaration of Paris on the goods and ships of neutrals. Let us now consider what the effect would be on the 7,744,000 tons of merchant vessels of the British Empire, if we were belligerents. The Declaration, part 3, says: "That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy's flag." But while that clause protects neutral goods in our ships from capture it does not protect the capture of the ships themselves by the cruisers of those nations with whom we were at war. Neutral ships make free goods, but neutral goods do not make free ships. So that if our ships were liable to capture they would neccessarily be driven off the seas; we would not even employ them ourselves when we could despatch our goods in neutral ships not liable to capture. Of course we might transfer them to a neutral, but even this step, humiliating as it would be to us as a nation, is surrounded with difficulties. During the late war in the United States, I know, of my own knowledge, that numerous American vessels were transferred to the British flag, but we could not transfer our vessels to the flag of the United States, for their

Navigation Laws, as well as those of various other nations, prohibit the registration of foreign-built vessels.

Although I do not find that Mr. Cobden, in his numerous masterly letters on the subject to myself, raises these points, I wish my readers to consider them very seriously. Of course, when our people saw the whole of their carrying trade passing into the hands of the Americans they would be greatly exasperated, and would insist (which they could in justice, as the United States were not parties to the Declaration) on the right to search for any property of their enemies they supposed was being conveyed under the neutral flag. But as America resisted that "right" in 1812, she would be much more likely to do so now, and as she would assuredly do so, war with her would be the consequence. We should then have "the world in arms" against us as we had in the early part of this century, but under *very different circumstances*. It is all very well to talk about our vast naval supremacy, but I deliberately state that, under such circumstances as these, we should be humiliated if not crushed as a nation. We should, no doubt, make a long and terrible struggle to maintain our position, but depending as we now do to so large an extent upon foreign nations for our supplies, and considering the fleets of privateers which America and the European nations with which we were at war would send forth *under her flag*, we should, in the long run, be obliged to succumb. Nor do I see how, under *such circumstances*, we could, with success, defend our shores from invasion, if our enemies, in Europe, possessed flotillas and large standing armies.

For these and various other reasons it behoves us to gravely consider the question of the Maritime International Laws now in force. WE ARE TRULY BETWEEN THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA! and I do not hesitate to state that we have been left so by the Paris Declaration of 1856, however desirable or however *necessary* it was for us to

become parties to that Declaration. It must be apparent to every impartial reader that the "sources and sinews of our naval power"—our vast Mercantile Marine, on which we justly pride ourselves—has become our most vulnerable point. For that reason alone it is clearly our interest to move onwards, and make all private property free from capture at sea. I have reason to believe that every other nation is still prepared to do so, and even should America now require that we take the further step in advance and abolish blockades, even that question is well worthy of our serious consideration. I know it has been said, that the power to blockade her commercial ports would be the chief instrument of warfare that we could bring to bear against her in the event of hostilities with the United States. But let us look at this question calmly for a moment. America has her railways traversing every portion of her vast continent, and if we blockaded New York and Boston she could ship her produce at Baltimore, Philadelphia, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and numerous other ports on her eastern shores; and if we effectually blockaded all these, which we have not the power to do, she could send her produce down the Mississippi to New Orleans, or across the continent by railway to San Francisco, or to various neutral ports on the shores of the Pacific. Vain, therefore, would be our efforts to crush her trade to an extent sufficient to command submission!

But what would be the effect upon ourselves of all this blockading system? Has Mr. Ross, or have those gentlemen who desire to maintain our belligerent rights in all their ancient integrity, and who will no doubt be horrified at the idea of having to give up the right of blockade, ever visited the port of Liverpool and contemplated the pyramids of cotton and the mountains of grain, in bags, besides what is stored away in our warehouses, with the vast piles of other provisions which we require to import from America for our daily existence? If they would

only do so for one day, and reflect over such facts, they would render far more service to their country than they can possibly do by years of study of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel, or even of the four volumes upon International Law by Sir Robert Phillimore.*

Having endeavoured to show what we lose by maintaining the rights of blockade, let us now consider what we gained by the exercise of that right in our most recent experience. Politically, we gained nothing by our war with Russia in 1854-56 as current events now show, for we are as far from a settlement of that bug-bear called the "Eastern Question" as ever we were; and in a pecuniary point of view what were our gains? Up to the 1st January, 1855, we had captured Russian and Finland vessels with their cargoes, which, when sold, produced the gross total of only £81,892. We burnt and scuttled half-a-dozen miserable luggers belonging to the town of Kola, most of whose inhabitants had, I dare say never heard of Constantinople, much less of the "four points," and after destroying the means of living of these poor, innocent people, we set fire to their town and left men, women, and children alike to die of cold or hunger. This is never called "glory!"

Such a nation as Great Britian should have been ashamed of her acts in the Baltic during the war with Russia. Moreover, we actually set fire to large stores of timber and tar, which had been bought and paid for by

* In 1875 we imported from the United States alone about 24,000,000 cwts. of wheat; 22,000,000 cwts. of Indian corn or maize; and of meal and flour more than 2,000,000 cwts.—all essential for our existence. And in the ten months of 1876, ending 31st October, we received from that country 6,766,853 cwts. of raw cotton, valued at £20,685,823, almost equally necessary, as the means of affording employment to vast masses of our people. Indeed, during the past ten months of the present year, I see by the Board of Trade returns that we have imported from the United States of Indian corn or maize alone no less than 35,343,867 cwts.

English merchants, and we did so "to put such a pressure on the Emperor of Russia that he must consent to our terms of peace!" Can any sane man suppose that a knowledge of such acts, if it ever reached him, which most likely it never did, would have had any effect on the mind of the Czar, much less influence his policy, or stay for one moment his ambition? How he must have laughed if he heard of English men-of-war burning in heaps English property found in his dominions!

But however effective the blockade of the Baltic may have been, it was little better than worthless in the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff, for in one season alone, that commencing in May, 1854, no less then' 453 ships, carrying 770,000 quarters of linseed, representing a value of one million sterling, sailed from those seas—a larger amount by 60,000 quarters than had been previously exported in any one year of peace! Nor does that appear to have arisen from any want of vigilance on our part; for Sir James Graham, then First Lord of the Admiralty, on the 26th May, and again on the 1st and 13th June, 1854, stated in the House of Commons, that distinct orders had been sent by the Governments of France and England to institute a "RIGOROUS *blockade*" of the principal Russian ports, both in the Baltic and in the BLACK SEA, and that the effect of that blockade would apply to ships of all nations, whether neutral, French, or English.

Apart altogether from the annoyance and cost to ourselves, how vain, therefore, were our efforts to injure Russia and bring her to terms, by the injury which her commerce sustained by the "rigorous blockade" of her ports. The *fact* is—and I must repeat it—the facilities of intercourse between nations have gone beyond the reach of all such antiquated hindrances as blockades; and however much we may, by precedent, be able to uphold our right to enforce them, the steam engine has driven through almost every international law. I am amused, if

a sadder thought did not enter my mind, when I think of jurists sitting in their dusky rooms, amidst piles of dusty law books, dictating to this nation what she ought to do, without one thought of matters as they now exist, or without any reference whatever to our Board of Trade returns, which, likely enough they never see.

But if, as some people say, blockades, are expedient, which I doubt, it may be well to inquire if their conditions cannot be still further modified than they were by the Declaration of 1856, for whether expedient or inexpedient, practicable or impracticable, the result is inevitable, to annihilate a large portion of our manufactures, to throw the trade into confusion, the cargoes into foreign bottoms, and to increase the cost in England of the raw material which affords employment for the labours of her people.

In the Paris Declaration of 1856, *no* stipulation has been made as to what constitutes contraband of war, arising, no doubt, from the fear that the difficulties with which it is surrounded, were of such a nature as might endanger the Declaration itself, or prolong its discussion for an indefinite period.

Vattel says*:—"Those things which are expressly used in war, and which are prevented from being carried to the enemy, we call contraband merchandise. Such are arms, munitions of war, timber, and all such things as serve for the building and arming of vessels of war; horses, and even provisions, on certain occasions, when it is attempted to reduce the enemy by famine."

These conditions, however, embrace articles much more extensively used in commerce than in war, and they do not include coal, which though now a vast article of commerce, has since become a very important material for war, but as such was then unknown. Other instances might be given to show that what Vattel justly considered

* "Droit des Gens," lib. 3, chap. 7, s. 112.

contraband could not be made so now without inflicting the most monstrous injustice upon neutrals.

No part of the laws of nations presents so many perplexing questions as that which concerns the rights of neutrals and belligerents in the case of blockades—of course, I refer to the blockade of commercial ports—especially when we have to deal with the question:—"What constitutes contraband of war?" It was this difference which first, in a great measure, involved Great Britain in a general European war; and it was this difference alone which brought about Napoleon's decrees, and our orders in council, whereby we required, that *no* neutral vessel, under any circumstances, should have any intercourse with France and her dependencies, unless she touched at a British port to have her cargo inspected, &c., &c., thus creating a state of anarchy, which made the ocean, destined for the use of mankind, as the peaceful highway of nations, one unhallowed arena of proscription and pillage.

It would be well, therefore, for nations, when peace prevails, and when the minds of statesmen can calmly consider this question, to attempt to define what shall in future be considered contraband, instead of allowing belligerent powers, as has hitherto been the practice, to make their own declarations in regard to it when war is proclaimed. The difficulties, however great, are far from insurmountable. A clear distinction, for instance, could be drawn between merchandise which is used by the civil population for manufacturing industry and consumption, even if used by the Government also in making warlike stores, and articles which are used chiefly and exclusively for the purposes of war. Provisions, timber, coal, iron, cotton, and hemp are illustrations of the former, and gunpowder, saltpetre, cannon, rifles, and made-up soldiers' clothing of the latter. Neutral mercantile vessels themselves might also be placed under the head of contraband

if they conveyed to the enemy any of the forbidden articles, or were engaged by the belligerents as transports for any purpose at any time during the war.

I am aware that during the Crimean war great numbers of vessels belonging to the United States of America were employed as regular transports by the French Government. And that during the American civil war vast shiploads of cannon, rifles, gunpowder, and warlike accoutrements, in every form, were dispatched from this country to the Northern States by our leading merchants, though I believe the usual warning proclamation of neutrality forbade all such shipments, unless at the shipper's risk and peril. Warlike stores of every kind are now being shipped from this country, and especially from the United States, alike to Turkey and Servia, and even to Russia itself, in anticipation of a war, in which we may, *though we ought not*, be involved. War stores were even shipped from this country to the Cape of Good Hope for the use of the Caffres, to fight against our own colonists, and the principal exporters were the colonists themselves!

The solution of such questions is, no doubt, surrounded with difficulties. For instance, to attempt to prevent *small arms* or even gunpowder might involve us in trouble. Ships for war, and cannon may be prevented; but while the law of contraband should not be drawn too tight, we surely can do more than has been done to prevent in war the export of articles, which are notoriously contraband of war, to nations with whom we are at peace.

In the case of blockade, if we do not agree to relinquish that right altogether, its limitation might be more defined. For instance, there is a wide difference between the blockade of a port strongly fortified, or of a belligerent naval station, or of a place in the line of belligerent operations, with a view to its capture, and that of a commercial port, where no object could be obtained by its blockade beyond a hindrance to its trade, and a vexatious interference with

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